ATP 2-01

Plan Requirements and Assess Collection

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Plan Requirements and Assess Collection

Contents

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Preface

ATP 2-01 establishes doctrine for the specific tasks under planning requirements and assessing collection. It expands on the principles in FM 3-55. ATP 2-01 should be used in conjunction with FM 3-55 and with FM 2-0. Readers should be familiar with fundamental doctrine contained in ADPs 2-0, 3-0, 5-0, and 6-0 and ADRPs 2-0, 3-0, 5-0, and 6-0.

This publication's primary audience is the intelligence and operations staffs within the Army's corps, divisions, brigade combat teams, and maneuver battalions. These staffs collaborate to develop the information collection plan. Commanders also must understand the importance of developing requirements and assessing collection as part of information collection planning and the operations process. Commanders and staffs of Army headquarters serving as a joint task force or multinational headquarters should refer joint doctrine contained in JP 2-01 or appropriate multinational doctrine. ATP 2-01 forms the foundation for instruction on planning requirements and assessing collection within the Army's educational system.

Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable U.S., international, and, in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement. (See FM 27-10.)

ATP 2-01 uses joint terms where applicable. Selected joint and Army terms and definitions appear in both the glossary and the text. Terms for which ATP 2-01 is the proponent publication (the authority) are marked with an asterisk (*) in the glossary. Definitions for which ATP 2-01 is the proponent publication are boldfaced in the text. For other definitions shown in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition.

ATP 2-01 applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and the U.S. Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

The proponent of ATP 2-01 is the U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence. The preparing agency is the Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate, U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence. Send written comments and recommendations on a DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence, ATTN: ATZS-CDI-D (ATP 2-01), 550 Cibeque Street, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-7017; by e-mail to usarmy.huachuca.icoe.mbx.doctrine@mail.mil; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.

Introduction

ATP 2-01 establishes doctrine for the specific functions under planning requirements and assessing collection. It expands on the principles in FM 3-55. ATP 2-01 should be used in conjunction with FM 3-55 and with FM 2-0. It outlines the preparation of planning requirements tools during the conduct (planning, preparation, execution, and assessment) of operations.

This publication provides details on the four continuing functions of planning requirements and assessing collection. It includes techniques for developing planning requirements tools and keeping them current throughout an operation. It addresses factors to consider when supporting offensive, defensive, and stability tasks. It also discusses considerations when operating in urban and nontemperate environments.

Although the discussions and descriptions in this manual may seem linear, planning requirements and assessing collection is a dynamic, continuous, and interactive process requiring constant interaction between the commander and staff. Depending on the mission, time available, ongoing operations, and standard operating procedures (SOPs), units may develop techniques for abbreviated information collection planning to meet the commander's needs. The information presented is descriptive, not prescriptive or restrictive. However, it describes the optimal process. This manual complies with Doctrine 2015 guidelines.

Chapter 1 discusses information collection and its tasks—planning requirements and assessing collection, task and direct collection, and execute collection—across the echelons and the vital role of the commander and staff. It also addresses the linkage between planning requirements and assessing collection, the military decisionmaking process (MDMP), intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), and targeting.

Chapter 2 describes how the commander provides the staff with inputs necessary to perform planning requirements and assessing collection and how the staff develops their respective running estimates, requests for information, and requirements. It also outlines the functions of planning requirements and assessing collection.

Chapter 3 discusses the development of requirements—the identification, prioritization, and refining of gaps in data and relevant information—and knowledge concerning the operational environment that must be resolved for the commander to achieve situational understanding.

Chapter 4 describes the development of planning requirements tools. These tools, developed by the intelligence staff, begin the process of synchronizing the information collection plan with the scheme of maneuver and are updated as the scheme of maneuver changes.

Chapter 5 discusses assessing the information collection plan, providing feedback to information collection assets, and retasking of assets.

Chapter 6 discusses the process of updating planning requirements tools and updating or revising the information collection plan to remain synchronized with operations.

Chapter 7 discusses the considerations for planning requirements and assessing collection when conducting offensive, defensive, and stability tasks.

Chapter 8 discusses the considerations for planning requirements and assessing collection for urban, mountain and cold weather, jungle, and desert environments.

Appendix A discusses joint, national, and multinational intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) planning considerations.

Appendix B provides tactics, techniques, and procedures for requesting aerial collection.

See introductory table-1 on page vi for significant changes in this version.

Introductory table 1. Summary of changes

General changes
• This version of ATP 2-01 incorporates changes to fundamental doctrine made since 2012. • This version of ATP 2-01 eliminates essential elements of information (also called EEIs) from Army doctrine. Joint doctrine still uses this term.
Term changes
• The term *planning requirements and assessing collection* is changed to *plan requirements and assess collection.* The wording of the definition is modified slightly but the meaning remains essentially unchanged. • This manual is now the proponent publication for the term *latest time information is of value.* The definition is unchanged.

PART ONE

Fundamentals

Chapter 1

Relationships

INFORMATION COLLECTION AND THE INTEGRATING TASKS

1-1. This chapter provides basic information regarding planning requirements and assessing collection. It starts with a brief discussion of information collection and its tasks, of which one is planning requirements and assessing collection. Then it discusses planning requirements and assessing collection across the echelons and the vital role of the commander and staff. Finally, it discusses the linkage between planning requirements and assessing collection, the MDMP, IPB, and targeting, all of which are executed to support current and future operations.

INFORMATION COLLECTION

1-2. The Army executes ISR through the operations and intelligence processes (with an emphasis on intelligence analysis and leveraging the larger intelligence enterprise) and information collection. *Information collection* is an activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of sensors and assets as well as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations (FM 3-55). FM 3-55 describes an *information collection capability* as any human or automated sensor, asset, or processing, exploitation, and dissemination (PED) system that can be directed to collect information that enables better decisionmaking, expands understanding of the operational environment, and supports warfighting functions in decisive action. Army doctrine on information collection highlights aspects that influence how the Army operates as a ground force in close and continuous contact with the environment, including the enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations.

INFORMATION COLLECTION TASKS

1-3. Information collection involves the acquisition of information and the provision of this information to processing elements and consists of the following tasks:

- Plan requirements and assess collection.
- Task and direct collection.
- Execute collection.

PLAN REQUIREMENTS AND ASSESS COLLECTION

1-4. ***Plan requirements and assess collection*** **is the task of analyzing requirements, evaluating available assets (internal and external), recommending to the operations staff taskings for information collection assets, submitting requests for information for adjacent and higher collection support, and assessing the effectiveness of the information collection plan**. It is a commander-driven, coordinated staff effort led by

the G-2/S-2. The continuous functions of planning requirements and assessing collection identify the best way to satisfy the requirements of the supported commander and staff. These functions are not necessarily sequential. The planning requirements and assessing collection functions are discussed in chapter 2 of this publication.

TASK AND DIRECT COLLECTION

1-5. The G-3/S-3 (based on recommendations from the staff) tasks, directs, and, when necessary, retasks the information collection assets. Tasking and directing of limited information collection assets is vital to their control and effective use. Staffs accomplish tasking information collection by issuing warning orders, fragmentary orders, and operation orders. They accomplish directing information collection assets by continuously monitoring the operation. Staffs conduct retasking to refine, update, or create new requirements. (See FM 3-55.)

EXECUTE COLLECTION

1-6. Executing collection focuses on requirements tied to the execution of tactical missions (normally reconnaissance, surveillance, security operations, and intelligence operations). (Army doctrine defines *intelligence operations* as the tasks undertaken by military intelligence units and Soldiers to obtain information to satisfy validated requirements [ADRP 2-0]. See appendix A for a discussion of joint intelligence operations.) Information acquired during collection activities about the threat and the area of interest is provided to intelligence processing and exploitation elements. (For intelligence purposes, *exploitation* is defined as taking full advantage of any information that has come to hand for tactical, operational, or strategic purposes [JP 2-01.3]). Typically, collection activities begin soon after receipt of mission and continue throughout preparation for and execution of the operation. They do not cease at the conclusion of the mission but continue as required. This allows the commander to focus combat power, execute current operations, and prepare for future operations simultaneously. (See FM 3-55.)

1-7. To provide effective support to execution, planning requirements and assessing collection must be linked to planned and ongoing operational activities. Plans and orders direct and coordinate information collection by providing information collection tasks based on validated requirements essential for mission accomplishment. Plans and orders help allocate scarce information collection assets effectively and efficiently. The intelligence staff must collaborate with higher, lower, and adjacent intelligence staffs to ensure the effectiveness of planning requirements and assessing collection.

COLLABORATION ACROSS ECHELONS

1-8. Planning requirements and assessing collection is integrated and layered across echelons. It is integrated with all other activities, systems, efforts, and capabilities associated with unified land operations to provide the information required to create intelligence. Integration occurs vertically and horizontally, with unified action partners and throughout the operations process. (See appendix A.) It also requires the intelligence staff to leverage the intelligence enterprise. (See ADRP 2-0.)

1-9. Requirements for information collection are arranged vertically and horizontally using a layered approach. Layering ensures the optimal use of limited information collection assets within a unit's task organization. Layering allows for mutual supporting activities to share requirements. Sharing requirements across echelons helps to support commanders at all levels.

ROLES OF THE COMMANDER AND STAFF

1-10. Commanders drive information collection activities through their choice of critical information requirements and through mission command. (See ADRP 6-0 for doctrine on mission command.) Commanders provide planning guidance with their initial intent statement. Planning guidance conveys the essence of the commander's visualization. (See FM 6-0.)

1-11. Effective planning requirements and assessing collection focuses information collection activities on obtaining the information required by commanders and staffs to influence decisions and operations. Planning requirements and assessing collection—

- Includes commander and staff efforts to synchronize and integrate information collection tasks throughout the operations process.
- Supports the commander's situational understanding and visualization of the operation by—
  - Identifying information gaps.
  - Coordinating assets and resources against requirements for information to fill these gaps.
  - Assessing the collected information and intelligence to inform the commander's decisions.
- Supports the staff during all operations process activities, integrating processes, and continuing activities (for example, during IPB and the MDMP, as well as the targeting, operations, and intelligence processes). (See ADRP 5-0.)

1-12. The direct result of the intelligence and operations staffs' efforts is a coordinated information collection plan. The information collection plan supports the operation with the necessary information collection assets and the required PED enablers to support collection and decisionmaking. As information and intelligence are assessed and refinements to the plan are made during execution, the operations staff issues fragmentary orders to retask or assign new missions to information collection assets. Chapter 2 discusses the commander and staff roles in more detail.

ARMY PROCESSES

1-13. In addition to its relationship to information collection, planning requirements and assessing collection relates to each of the Army's integrating processes and continuing activities, primarily to the MDMP, IPB and targeting process.

RELATIONSHIP WITH THE MILITARY DECISIONMAKING PROCESS

1-14. During mission analysis, the staff develops a list of initial information requirements. (See FM 6-0.) This list is based on higher headquarters tasks, commander's guidance, staff assessments, and subordinate and adjacent unit requests for information. This list also identifies requirements for each potential threat course of action and any civil considerations—then, later in MDMP, the friendly course of action the commander selects as the concept of operations. The staff also develops and recommends initial commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs) during mission analysis. These CCIRs identify information critical for planning. They usually result in information collection missions executed while planning for the overall operation is underway. Commanders decide what information is critical based on their experience, the mission, the higher commander's specified and implied intent, and the input from the entire staff.

1-15. At the conclusion of the wargame, the commander designates the CCIRs for the mission. These CCIRs identify information requirements essential to support decisionmaking during execution. At this point, it is important for the staff to determine, whether by time or event, the point in the operation where satisfying each CCIR ceases to be critical. This is usually done by associating a latest time information is of value (LTIOV). The staff prioritizes the information collection effort based on these determinations.

1-16. Figure 1-1 on page 1-4 lists the MDMP steps and the corresponding outputs specific to planning requirements and assessing collection that either involve the intelligence staff or that the intelligence staff directly prepares during planning. (For more information on the MDMP, see FM 6-0.)

Key inputs	MDMP Step	Key outputs
• Higher headquarters plan or order • Higher headquarters IPB products	Step 1 Receipt of Mission	• Issue commander's guidance • Develop initial information requirements • Issue warning order
	Warning Order	
• Higher headquarters plan or order • Higher headquarters IPB products • Updated running estimates • Initial commander's guidance	Step 2 Mission Analysis	• **Develop initial CCIRs** • Develop initial enemy situation template • Develop initial high-value target list • **Review initial information collection resource availability and status** • **Obtain commander's guidance for informations collection** • **Create initial planning requirements tools** • Create initial information collection plan • Issue warning order
	Warning Order	
• Updated IPB products • **Specified and implied information collection tasks**	Step 3 COA Development	• **Update planning requirements tools** • **Update information collection plan**
• Updated IPB products • **Specified and implied information collection tasks**	Step 4 COA Analysis	• **Update planning requirements tools** • **Update information collection plan** • Refine CCIRs and information requirements
• Wargame results • Updated running estimates • Updated CCIRs	Step 5 COA Comparison	• Recommend COAs • **Update planning requirements tools** • **Update information collection plan** • **Refine CCIRs**
• Recommended COAs • **Updated planning requirements tools and information collection plan** • Updated CCIRs and information requirements	Step 6 COA Approval	• **Update planning requirements tools** • **Update information collection plan** • Update CCIRs and information requirements • Issue warning order
	Warning Order	
• Commander selected COA • **Updated planning requirements tools and information collection plan** • Updated CCIRs and information requirements	Step 7 Orders Production, Dissemination, and Transition	• **Approved information collection plan** • Approved CCIRs and information requirements

CCIR commander's critical information requirement
COA course of action
IPB intelligence preparation of the battlefield
MDMP military decisionmaking process

Figure 1-1. Planning requirements and assessing collection tasks within the military decisionmaking process

RELATIONSHIP WITH INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD

1-17. Planning requirements and assessing collection relies on the results of IPB. The staff's completion of IPB provides an analysis of the operational environment and the options it presents to friendly and threat forces. It also provides information required to plan information collection activities, such as—

- Characteristics of the area of interest that will influence friendly and threat operations (including civil considerations).
- Enemy event templates, including decision points and matrices critical to information collection planning.

- Information collection assets' sensitivities to weather and the effects of weather on planned or potential operations.
- Threat characteristics, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and behavior.
- Possible and likely threat courses of action.
- High-value targets.

1-18. For more information on IPB see FM 2-01.3. For more information on operational environments see JP 3-0.

RELATIONSHIP WITH TARGETING

1-19. The targeting process produces requirements that are incorporated into planning requirement tools and the unit's information collection plan. The tools and plan contain tasks for target development, target detection, and combat assessment that support the scheme of fires.

1-20. To effectively target the threat, the staff develops named areas of interest (NAIs) and targeted areas of interest (TAIs). The staff also develops a high-value target list that can include geographic NAIs or TAIs as well as organizations, networks, or individuals identified as key or critical nodes. Targeting requirements must support the commander's objectives and intent. In certain circumstances, some requirements may not be focused on a certain geographic area. (See FM 3-60.)

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Chapter 2

Inputs and Functions

ROLES OF THE COMMANDER AND STAFF

2-1. The commander and staff interact to provide input to planning requirements and assessing collection throughout the overall operation. Based on this input, the staff performs the planning requirements and assessing functions. (See figure 2-1.) This chapter discusses how the commander provides the staff with inputs necessary to perform planning requirements and assessing collection. It then describes how the staff, using the commander's inputs, develops their respective running estimates, requests for information, and requirements. Finally, it outlines the functions of planning requirements and assessing collection, specifically why each is important and their successful results.



Figure 2-1. Commander and staff inputs to planning requirements and assessing collection

COMMANDER AND STAFF INPUT

2-2. The commander is the most important participant in planning requirements and assessing collection. The initial commander's intent, planning guidance, and CCIRs form the foundation of the information collection plan and the basis for assessing its execution. During planning and preparation, the staff, primarily the operations and intelligence working group, develops the information collection plan and the staff products required to execute it. During execution, they oversee execution of the plan, keeping the staff products current and using them to keep information collection efforts synchronized with the overall operation. The staff updates planning requirements as operations unfold and modify the plan as necessary to satisfy new information requirements that emerge.

COMMANDER INPUT

2-3. During planning, the commander's visualization provides the basis for developing the order, including the information collection plan. Commanders and staffs continuously assess the progress of operations toward the desired end state.

2-4. When providing guidance, commanders consider that military intelligence collection assets are distinct from other Army information collection capabilities. The distinction is required because intelligence collection is enabled by and must comply with all applicable U.S. laws and policy. While there are too many to list completely, these include but are not limited to the authorities listed in table 2-1. Commanders should request assistance from their servicing judge advocate to interpret or deconflict these legal authorities when necessary.

Table 2-1. Sources of law and policy applicable to intelligence operations

- Executive Order 12333
- AR 381-10
- DOD 5240.1-R
- DODD 2310.1E
- DODD 3115.09
- FM 2-22.3
- FM 27-10
- Rules of engagement
- Law of land warfare
- Relevant Department of Defense instructions
- National Security Council intelligence directives
- U.S. signals intelligence directives
- *Manual for Courts-Martial* (Uniform Code of Military Justice)
- International treaties, such as the Hague Convention (1899 and 1907), the Geneva Conventions (1949), and Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (1977)
- Military orders, including fragmentary orders
- Status of forces agreements

2-5. After commanders visualize an operation, they communicate their visualization to their staffs and subordinates. Through collaboration and dialog, commanders ensure subordinates understand the visualization well enough to begin planning. As it pertains to information collection activities, commanders express their initial visualization in terms of—

- Initial commander's intent.
- Planning guidance, including an initial concept of operations.
- Requirements.

Initial Commander's Intent

2-6. The initial commander's intent links the operation's purpose with the conditions that define the desired end state. The staff uses the initial commander's intent statement to develop and refine requirements and assess the information collection plan throughout the operation. Usually, the initial intent statement evolves as planning progresses and more information becomes available. The information collection plan evolves concurrently.

Planning Guidance

2-7. Commanders provide planning guidance with their initial intent statement. Planning guidance conveys the essence of the commander's visualization. Effective planning guidance is essentially an initial concept of operations that prioritizes the information collection activities. Planning guidance—

- Reflects how the commander sees the operation unfolding.
- Broadly describes *when*, *where*, and *how* the commander intends to employ combat power to accomplish the mission within the higher commander's intent.
- For planning requirements, provides the staff information to begin the steps within the planning activity of the operations process, that is, to develop an initial information collection plan, which is refined into the final plan that is incorporated into the unit order.

Requirements

2-8. Commanders base their initial information requirements on the critical gaps identified during IPB in the mission analysis step of the MDMP. Refined and updated requirements result from staff wargaming and the commander's selection of a particular friendly course of action that becomes the concept of operations. Commanders drive planning requirements and assessing collection through their choice of critical information requirements and through mission command throughout the operations process.

2-9. For requirements management, there are two types of requirements that result from planning requirements and assessing collection: priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) that are part of the CCIRs, and information requirements. PIRs and information requirements may focus on threat units or on capabilities the threat requires to complete missions and tasks. Each requirement is further refined into discrete pieces of information that together answer that requirement. These pieces are referred to as indicators and specific information requirements (SIRs). The indicators and SIRs are used to develop the information collection plan. (See figure 2-2.)



Figure 2-2. Relationship between priority intelligence requirements, indicators, and specific information requirements

Information Requirements

2-10. An *information requirement* is any information element the commander and staff require to successfully conduct operations (ADRP 6-0). They include all elements necessary to address the mission variables (mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations [also called METT-TC]). For the purposes of the intelligence warfighting function, *validated information collection plan requirements* are requirements that, when answered, will fill a gap in knowledge and understanding of the area of operations (AO) and the area of interest.

Commander's Critical Information Requirements

2-11. A *commander's critical information requirement* is an information requirement identified by the commander as being critical to facilitating timely decisionmaking (JP 3-0). The two CCIR categories are friendly force information requirements and PIRs. (See figure 2-3.) A CCIR directly influences decisionmaking and facilitates the successful execution of military operations. Commanders decide whether to designate an information requirement as a CCIR based on likely decisions and their visualization of the course of the operation. A CCIR may support more than one decision. During planning, staffs recommend information requirements for commanders to designate as CCIRs. During preparation and execution, they recommend changes to CCIRs based on assessment. A CCIR is—

- Specified by a commander for a specific operation.
- Applicable only to the commander who specifies it.
- Situation-dependent—directly linked to a current or future mission.
- Focused on predictable events or activities.
- Time-sensitive—CCIR answers are reported to the commander immediately by any means available.



Figure 2-3. Information requirements

2-12. **Priority Intelligence Requirements**. A *priority intelligence requirement* is an intelligence requirement, stated as a priority for intelligence support, that the commander and staff need to understand the adversary or other aspects of the operational environment (JP 2-01). PIRs identify information about the enemy, terrain and weather, and civil considerations that the commander considers most important. The intelligence staff manages PIRs for the commander. Commanders limit the number of PIRs to focus the efforts of limited information collection assets. This helps staffs and subordinates identify information the commander needs immediately. A good staff expertly distills that information, identifying answers to PIRs and disseminating them to the commander immediately.

2-13. **Friendly Force Information Requirements**. A *friendly force information requirement* is information the commander and staff need to understand the status of friendly force and supporting capabilities (JP 3-0). Friendly force information requirements identify the information the commander considers most important about the mission, troops and support available, and time available for friendly forces. In coordination with the staff, the G-3/S-3 manages friendly force information requirements for the commander.

STAFF INPUT

2-14. Planning requirements and assessing collection consists of various staff functions designed to place collection assets and resources into a synchronized plan in order to leverage the various capabilities. The plan synchronizes and coordinates collection activities within the overall concept of operations. The information collection plan positions and tasks collection assets so they can collect the right information, sustain or reconstitute for branches or sequels, or shift priorities as the situation develops. Effective planning for information collection focuses on answering the commander's requirements by translating information collection tasks into orders.

2-15. Planning requirements and assessing information collection requires full staff integration. The staff—

- Prepares or updates their respective running estimates.
- Develops requirements.
- Participates in the operations and intelligence working group (if formed).
- Develops technical channels (as required).

Running Estimates

2-16. A *running estimate* is the continuous assessment of the current situation used to determine if the current operation is proceeding according to the commander's intent and if planned future operations are supportable (ADP 5-0). Intelligence staffs (or the operations and intelligence working group, if formed) use running estimates to assist with determining whether requirements have been satisfied, the need for additional requirements, and which assets are available for tasking. (See FM 6-0 for additional information on running estimates.)

Operations and Intelligence Working Group

2-17. Depending on the availability of personnel, the commander may designate an operations and intelligence working group. The primary staff officers for operations and intelligence (G-3/S-3 and G-2/S-2) should direct and manage the efforts of this working group to achieve a fully synchronized and integrated information collection plan.

2-18. The operations and intelligence working group is a temporary grouping of designated staff representatives who coordinate and integrate information collection, and provide recommendations to the commander. The purpose of the operations and intelligence working group is to bring together representatives from all command post cells to validate information requirements and deconflict the use of organic and attached assets. The operations and intelligence working group ensures maximum efficiency in information collection by carefully synchronizing all collection tasks within the information collection plan. Input is required from each member of the working group.

2-19. Unit SOPs and the operation's tempo determine how frequently the operations and intelligence working group needs to meet. This working group should be closely aligned with both the current operations and integration cell and the future operations (or plans) cell to ensure information collection is properly integrated into the overall operation plan.

2-20. The G-3/S-3 comes prepared to provide the following:

- The current friendly situation.
- Current CCIRs.
- The status and availability of collection assets.
- Requirements from higher headquarters (including recent fragmentary orders or taskings).
- Changes to the commander's intent.
- Changes to the task organization.
- Future operations.

2-21. The G-2/S-2 comes prepared to provide the following:

- The current enemy situation.
- Current status of PIRs, and potential changes to PIRs.
- The current information collection priorities and strategies.
- The status and availability of intelligence operations assets.

- Current planning requirements tools.
- The situational template tailored to the time discussed.
- Current status of the communication plan for information collection assets.
- Support the G-2/S-2 must request from higher headquarters' resources.
- Weather and effects of weather on information collection assets.
- Civil considerations (as applicable).

2-22. Outputs of the working group include but are not limited to—

- Priorities and recommendations for latest information collection plan.
- Updated CCIRs for commander approval.
- Information collection input for fragmentary orders.

2-23. See FM 6-0 for doctrine on command post cells and working groups. See FM 3-55 for details on the operations and intelligence working group.

Technical Channels

2-24. Information normally moves throughout a force along specific transmission paths, or channels. Establishing these channels directs the flow of reported information derived during intelligence operations. Channels help streamline information dissemination by ensuring the right information passes promptly to the right people. Commanders and staffs normally communicate through three channels—command, staff, and technical. (See ADRP 6-0 and FM 6-02.71.)

2-25. For intelligence operations, technical channels are the transmission paths between intelligence units (to include command post cells and staff elements) performing a technical function requiring special expertise. Technical channels are used to transmit required technical data used to focus the highly technical intelligence operations collection. Establishing intelligence technical channels facilitates adherence to existing policies or regulations for information collection tasks contained within the information collection plan. Technical channels do not interfere with command and staff channels. Technical channels are not used for conducting operations.

2-26. While planning requirements and assessing collection, the intelligence staff ensures that technical channels are used to focus intelligence collectors appropriately. These channels facilitate a collaborative environment and more efficient intelligence operations. The collector or lowest level management for the collector, in turn provides feedback of a technical nature to the intelligence staff. An example of this feedback is when a collector is tasked to collect on threat communications but does not possess the equipment capable of intercepting the signal. The collector provides this feedback to the intelligence staff. The staff then has the tasking revised or requests support from an adjacent or higher headquarters. (See ADRP 2-0 for more information on technical channels.)

PLANNING REQUIREMENTS AND ASSESSING COLLECTION FUNCTIONS

2-27. After receiving inputs from the commander and staff—intent, planning guidance, and requirements—the intelligence staff, in close coordination with the operations staff, performs the planning requirements and assessing collection functions. (See figure 2-4.) The planning requirements and assessing collection functions are the basis for creating an information collection plan that synchronizes activities of the information collection effort to enable the commander's visualization and situational understanding. The intelligence staff, in coordination with the operations staff, monitors available collection assets and assesses their ability to provide the required information. They also recommend adjustments to new requirements or locations of information collection assets, if required. The planning requirements and assessing collection functions are—

- Develop planning requirements.
- Develop planning requirements tools.
- Assess information collection.
- Update planning requirements tools.



Figure 2-4. Planning requirements and assessing collection functions

DEVELOP PLANNING REQUIREMENTS

2-28. Developing requirements involves identifying, prioritizing, and refining uncertainties concerning the threat and significant aspects of the operational environment that must be resolved to accomplish the mission. The purpose of the develop requirements function is to receive, analyze, and prioritize requirements appropriate to task to organic assets as part of the information collection plan.

2-29. An important element of developing requirements during execution is the constant collaboration between analytical personnel and staff elements of the various command post cells to refine information requirements and focus the information collection effort as the situation develops.

2-30. The result of requirements development is a prioritized list of validated requirements. Successful requirements development results in—

- The information arriving in time for commanders to use.
- Analysts receiving information that directly relates to the CCIRs.
- Collection carried out only on requirements important to the operation.

DEVELOP PLANNING REQUIREMENTS TOOLS

2-31. The intelligence staff creates and uses planning requirements tools to track planned and ongoing information collection tactical tasks—reconnaissance, surveillance, security operations, and intelligence operations. These tools are not tasking documents or systems; they are products developed to facilitate the synchronization of collection and analytical efforts. The intelligence staff uses the tools to assist the operations staff in creating the information collection plan.

2-32. The subfunction tasks to develop planning requirements tools (see chapter 4) are—

- Evaluate resources.
- Develop a collection strategy.
  - Submit requests for support (collection).
  - Submit requests for information.
  - Match information collection asset capabilities to expected activity.
  - Develop SIRs.
- Develop supporting tools.
  - Information collection matrix.
  - Information collection synchronization matrix.
  - Information collection overlay.

2-33. The result of develop requirements planning tools is the creation of working aids that assist in the creation and execution of an information collection plan that answers the CCIRs. Success results in the synchronization of information collection with the overall operation through the effective use of the right collection assets at the right time and place. Successful requirements planning tools result in—

- Selecting a collection asset with the appropriate capability.
- Focusing the collection asset on the right area at the right time to answer the requirements.

ASSESSING COLLECTION

2-34. Assessing collection involves two concurrent tasks: assessing the information collection plan and assessing tactical task execution. Commanders and staffs continuously evaluate the information collection plan based on the assessment of results from tactical tasks. Collection assessment is particularly important during execution because situations change rapidly; evaluation identifies updates for information collection activities. Together, commanders and staffs determine if CCIRs have been satisfied or are still relevant.

2-35. The subfunction tasks of assess tactical task execution (see chapter 5) are—

- Monitor the tactical situation.
- Screen reporting to ensure task completion.
- Correlate reports to requirements.

- Provide feedback to assets.
- Maintain synchronization with operations.
- Cue assets to collection opportunities.
- Recommend retasking of assets.

2-36. Monitoring information collection tasks aids in identifying the need to retask assets as the situation changes or cue assets to collection opportunities. Effective monitoring allows the intelligence and operations staffs to keep the information collection plan current. To support this goal, the rest of the staff also monitors the situation from the perspective of their command post cell to identify possible issues that need to be brought to the attention of the G-3/S-3.

UPDATE PLANNING REQUIREMENTS TOOLS

2-37. As the situation changes, adjustments to the planning requirements tools keep information collection synchronized with the overall operation, thus optimizing the force's collection effort. Satisfied requirements are deleted, and collectors remain focused on unsatisfied and new requirements. Success results in the collection and reporting of information when needed to support the commander's decisions.

2-38. The subfunctions of update planning requirements tools (see chapter 6) are—

- Receive inputs from the commander and staff.
- Eliminate satisfied requirements.
- Develop and add new requirements.
- Transition to the next operation.

2-39. The functions of planning requirements and assessing collection are continuous, collaborative, and interactive. Several outputs from the various MDMP steps require collaboration with the rest of the staff, especially between the intelligence and operations staffs. Keeping the planning tools current cannot be achieved without constant coordination among the entire staff. At every step in the MDMP, the intelligence staff relies on input from the rest of the staff and cooperation with the operations staff to develop information collection products that support the commander's requirements and maximize collection efficiency.

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PART TWO

Techniques

Chapter 3

Developing Requirements

ROLE OF DEVELOPING REQUIREMENTS

3-1. Requirements development forms the foundation of the information collection plan. This chapter describes how to perform the tasks associated with this function. Developing requirements includes the following subfunction tasks:

- Participate in planning.
- Anticipate requirements.
- Analyze requirements.
- Refine requirements.

PARTICIPATE IN PLANNING

3-2. Throughout planning, requirements are developed and refined; some are consolidated, others discarded. Commanders and staffs add and delete individual requirements throughout an operation based on the information needed for specific decisions.

3-3. Requirements development begins as early as possible—in some cases before receipt of mission, when only partial information about the general location or category of a mission is known. Development continues as the intelligence staff collects initial (baseline) information and intelligence from existing sources and databases and through intelligence reach to develop the initial intelligence estimate in support of planning. Other command post cells gather information as they prepare or update their running estimates to support planning.

3-4. Maximum efficiency in information collection is achieved when all the collection tasks are carefully synchronized throughout an operation. This appropriate mix of collection tasks helps satisfy as many different requirements as possible. It also reduces the likelihood of the operations and intelligence working group favoring or becoming too reliant on one particular unit, intelligence discipline, or system.

3-5. The intelligence staff and other staff members continue to develop and refine requirements as the commander receives the mission and presents initial guidance to the staff. The commander's guidance includes the critical information for the AO and area of interest that the commander must know to successfully conduct operations, expressed in later steps of the MDMP as CCIRs.

3-6. The commander decides what information is critical based on experience, the mission, input from the staff, the higher commander's intent, and the staff's recommendations. Critical information requirements are based on events or activities linked directly to the current and future situation.

3-7. Because developing requirements is continuous, the function occurs throughout all activities of the operations process. Developing requirements results in the production of new requirements from ongoing

operations that drive new operations, branches, and sequels. Effective requirements development depends on establishing the intelligence architecture and having effective network connectivity that provides situational understanding and input from the entire staff. Command post cells and staff elements use the following products to identify gaps that may result in information requirements:

- Detailed and current IPB.
- Current intelligence running estimate.
- Current running estimates from other command post cells and staff elements.
- Enemy situation templates and course of action statements.
- Event templates and matrices.
- Estimates and templates of anticipated civil responses to friendly and threat operations (as applicable).

3-8. Requirements management is not a one-time effort or the sole responsibility of the intelligence staff. Each staff element that develops requirements must follow the same development process. Figure 3-1 depicts the developing requirements subfunction tasks and products.

ANTICIPATE REQUIREMENTS

3-9. The intelligence staff and other staff members identify new requirements or refine existing ones and present them to the commander for approval. The intelligence staff must recognize when and where to shift collection assets and make timely recommendations to the operations staff. Anticipating and developing new requirements requires a detailed understanding of the unit and its operational capabilities. It also requires a detailed situational understanding, a thorough understanding of IPB products and existing intelligence holdings, and an understanding of the concept of operations—including branches, sequels, and anticipated transitions to follow-on operations.

3-10. The ability to anticipate requirements gives intelligence staffs additional time to plan the use of information collection assets, including any joint or national assets available. It requires seamless involvement with the planners and operations staff. Anticipating upcoming requirements allows intelligence staffs to communicate with higher headquarters and plan future requests for information. The more time intelligence staffs give units that control Army, joint, and national systems, the more likely they are to obtain the required support for a specified time frame. A good example is forecasting additional support needed during critical events, such as national elections while conducting stability tasks, or during the initial phases of an attack.

ANALYZE REQUIREMENTS

3-11. The intelligence staff analyzes requirements to determine the most effective use of information collection assets. Each requirement is analyzed to determine how best to satisfy it. Sometimes this does not require tasking a unit, organization, or sensor for collection. Often, a newly received requirement can be satisfied by intelligence reach or by submitting a request for information. Analyzing requirements involves separating, recording, validating, consolidating, and prioritizing each recommended requirement.



Figure 3-1. Requirements development

SEPARATE

3-12. Intelligence staffs place intelligence gaps into one of three categories based on how best to answer them. These categories are—

- **Intelligence reach.** Intelligence reach allows access to resources of national, joint, foreign, and other military organizations and units. Requesters can acquire information through push and pull of information, databases, homepages, collaborative tools, and broadcast services. Intelligence reach also supports distributed analysis. (See ADRP 2-0.)
- **Requests for information.** Submitting a request for information to the next higher headquarters or adjacent units is the normal procedure for obtaining intelligence information that available information collection assets cannot collect. Users enter requests for information into a management system where every other system user can see them. Thus, an organization several echelons above the actual requester can become aware of the request and answer it.
- **Request for support (collection).** When a gap cannot be answered by available sources and assets, intelligence staffs submit requests for support (collection) to higher and lateral organizations for incorporation into their information collection plans.

RECORD

3-13. In addition to requirements produced from mission analysis, course of action analysis (wargaming), and current operations, intelligence staffs receive requirements based on tasks from higher units and requests for information. Various working groups also generate requirements. Requirements from higher, adjacent, and subordinate units are recorded along with requirements produced during planning. The record tracks each requirement, from its receipt to its eventual satisfaction, merger, or elimination. Recording can be done using a spreadsheet, database, or other mechanism prescribed by unit SOP.

VALIDATE

3-14. Once recorded, the intelligence staff validates the requirements. Remember the commander provides the final validation of requirements when approving the operation order or fragmentary order. A valid requirement is necessary, feasible, and complete.

- **Necessity.** Is this requirement really necessary? If yes, has it already been satisfied? If it has not, check databases to see if someone has already collected the information or produced the intelligence. If a product that satisfies the requirement already exists, provide the requester to the agency that produced it. If the requester does not have access to that agency's database, then obtain and provide the product to the requester. Refer requests for production to the appropriate agency. In some cases, the intelligence already exists but not in the format the requester desires. For example, a unit may need a demographic map created from existing data. In those cases, ask the requester if the product on hand will answer the requirement. If so, provide it.
- **Feasibility.** Does the unit have assets with capabilities able to execute the mission in time and with the detail required to support a decision? If not, can the unit submit a request for information to the echelon owning the information collection capability with a reasonable expectation of receiving a timely response?
- **Completeness.** All requirements should specify—
  - ***Who*** (needs the results).
  - ***When*** (time the indicator is expected to occur and the latest time the commander needs to know).
  - ***What*** (activity or indicator).
  - ***Where*** (geolocation, NAI, or TAI).
  - ***Why*** (justification).
  - ***Other*** (specific instructions or information).

3-15. Once requirements are validated, existing information, such as a database, is examined to determine if requirements can be satisfied with existing information through either a request for information to higher or lateral units or through intelligence reach. If the requirement cannot be completely satisfied by either of

these methods, the requirement is further refined and provided to the operations staff for incorporation into the information collection plan.

CONSOLIDATE

3-16. Requirements received as tasks and requests are often similar to those generated during planning. Consolidation involves identifying identical and similar requirements and combining them into a single requirement. Successful consolidation results in a smaller number of requirements to track and identification of subordinate elements that may be capable of collecting on a requirement.

3-17. Merging similar requirements simplifies the collection effort. For example, replace a poorly written requirement with the wording of the better justified or more specific requirement. However, exercise caution by—

- Ensuring the intent of the original requirements is not lost when merging requirements.
- Maintaining accountability of merged requirements through accurate recordkeeping.
- Disseminating requirements to every requesting headquarters when requirements are satisfied or eliminated.

PRIORITIZE

3-18. Each requirement is prioritized based on its importance in supporting the concept of operations and anticipated decisions. Prioritization based on the commander's guidance and the current situation ensures limited collection assets are directed towards the most critical requirements. Effective prioritization requires monitoring the operation to respond to changing situations.

3-19. When prioritizing, the significance of the requirement to the requester is considered more important than the echelon that generated the requirement. A subordinate commander's requirement may well be more important to the success of the higher headquarters' mission than all other requirements.

3-20. When prioritizing requirements over the course of the operation, intelligence staffs should consider their ability to meet requirements as well as the justification, specificity, significance, and time phasing of individual requirements.

Significance

3-21. Some tasks the force performs are more important to accomplishing the mission than others. During wargaming, commanders give guidance on what they consider most important. In any case, the commander's intent is reflected in the priorities assigned to each phase of the operation. This is the basis for establishing a prioritized requirements list from which to make recommendations to the commander for approval.

3-22. After intelligence staffs prioritize the requirements and make recommendations, commanders designate some of the most important requirements as PIRs. Answering PIRs is mission-essential. In other words, failure to satisfy the PIRs endangers the command's mission accomplishment. For maximum effectiveness, intelligence staffs and commanders should refine PIRs into specific questions. The significance of a requirement is often tied to the phase of the operation in which the information is required.

Time Phasing

3-23. Time phasing influences prioritization. Requirements time phasing, like synchronization, is a continuous process. The operation may progress more or less quickly than anticipated during wargaming. Consequently, expected timelines based on wargaming may change during the operation. Staffs monitor execution of the operation and remain alert for changes in the LTIOV based on other shifts in the operational timeline. ***Latest time information is of value*** **is the time by which an intelligence organization or staff must deliver information to the requester in order to provide decisionmakers with timely intelligence. This must include the time anticipated for processing and disseminating that information as well as for making the decision.** The most important requirement may have an LTIOV in a later phase of an operation.

3-24. Normally, each requirement is tied to a point in the operation when satisfying it will be critically important. Often, this point is an anticipated decision. After that, the requirement may become insignificant or unnecessary to collect against. Consequently, the relative priority of each requirement may change over time. Some PIRs may remain the same for the duration of the operation, while other PIRs change during the operation—from phase to phase or based on the sequence of events as they unfold.

3-25. The staff establishes LTIOVs based on the commander's input, the priorities in each phase of the operation, and by considering the time required to deliver the finished intelligence to the commander and staff. The staff must be sure to establish an LTIOV that allows delivery of the intelligence in time for the commander to make a decision.

3-26. Another method for establishing LTIOVs is using an enemy event or a trigger as the basis for when information is required. Critical events are those that directly influence mission accomplishment. They include events that trigger significant actions or decisions and essential tasks identified during mission analysis. The list of critical events includes major events from the unit's current position to the accomplishment of the mission. Decision points are events or locations where decisions are required during mission execution. Decision points relate to identified critical events and are linked to NAIs and TAIs.

REFINE REQUIREMENTS

3-27. The developing requirements function does not end with the commander's approval of the PIRs. Each requirement is further broken down into groups and indicators by the intelligence staff. This facilitates matching requirements to collection asset capabilities while developing the planning requirements tools. (See figure 2-2 on page 2-3.)

3-28. Using PIRs as a basis, the intelligence staff develops discrete groups. These groups further refine PIRs into areas where information can be collected by collection assets and resources. For example, groupings for the PIR "What threat cells are conducting attacks that destabilize the AO?" might be—

- Where are the threat leaders, facilitators, technicians, and agents operating in villages X, Y, and Z?
- Where are the threat cell's support zones in the AO, specifically in the vicinity of villages X, Y, and Z?
- Where does the threat cell receive active and passive support?

INDICATORS

3-29. An *indicator*, in intelligence usage, is an item of information which reflects the intention or capability of an adversary to adopt or reject a course of action (JP 2-0). Indicators are positive or negative information regarding threat activity or any characteristic of the AO that—

- Points toward threat capabilities and vulnerabilities.
- Points toward the adoption or rejection by the threat of a particular course of action or activity.
- May influence the commander's selection of a course of action.

3-30. Indicators may result from previous actions or from threat failure to take action and usually do not stand alone. Indicators are typically not sent out as part of the information collection tasks but rather are used primarily by all-source intelligence analysts. All-source intelligence analysts develop indicators, integrating each one with other factors to detect patterns or signatures and establish threat intentions. An initial set of indicators is developed during the MDMP.

3-31. Indicators corresponding to the PIRs and groups described in paragraphs 3-27 and 3-28 might be—

- Identification of agitators, insurgents, or criminal organizations, their supporters, and sympathizers who suddenly appear in or move from an area.
- Evidence of increased foot and vehicle traffic.
- Increased travel within and into remote or isolated areas.
- Apartments, houses, or buildings being rented but not lived in as homes.

3-32. The mission statement, key tasks, and PIRs signify the initiation of developing requirements and the initial information collection plan. The G-2/S-2 identifies requirements appropriate to task to unit collection

assets and recommends tasking those assets to the G-3/S-3. The G-3/S-3 includes these recommendations in the Tasks to Subordinate Units subparagraph of paragraph 3 (Execution) of either the base order or of annex L (Information Collection) to the order. Subordinate units incorporate assigned tasks into their individual information collection plans. Tasks to subordinate units that must be executed before the operation order is issued are conveyed to those units in a either a warning order or separate operation order issued by the G-3/S-3.

3-33. After performing functional analysis and developing threat models, the intelligence staff is prepared to further refine PIRs into areas where information can be collected by collection assets and resources. For the major threat groups operating within the AO in a counterinsurgency environment, these groupings may include—

- **Leadership:**
  - *Who* are cell leaders?
  - *How* do they operate within the urban areas of the AO?
- **Safe havens:** *Where* are groups receiving passive and active support?
- **Movement:** *Where* and *how* are cell members moving throughout the AO?
- **Logistics:** Centered on weapons and weapon-making materials, *how* are materials obtained for offensive and defensive tasks?
- **Finance:** *How* are group operations funded?
- **Intelligence collection:** *How* are groups receiving information and conducting reconnaissance and surveillance of targets?
- **Personnel:**
  - *How* are cells structured?
  - *How* are they receiving and incorporating new personnel?
- **Ideology:** *How* are groups using the information environment?
- **Communication:**
  - *How* do groups communicate internally within the group?
  - *How* do groups communicate externally with other groups?

3-34. Economic-based PIRs may have the following associated groupings:

- How do telecommunications in the area of interest impact the economy?
- How do natural resources in the area of interest impact the economy?
- How do power plants in the area of interest impact the economy?
- How do marketplaces in the area of interest impact the economy?
- What is normally traded within these markets?
- What are the normal prices of food items?
- What are the normal prices of clothing items?
- Are new items being sold within the markets?

3-35. Economic-based PIRs based on the threat may have the following associated groupings:

- What businesses are targeted by the threat?
- What businesses support the threat?
- What illegal products are produced, sold, or traded in the market place?

3-36. Information-based PIRs may have the following associated groupings:

- What are the information sources, resource facilities, and organizations within the area of interest?
- What are the official and unofficial information channels within the area of interest?
- What are the means of communication within the civilian population?
- What media representatives and organizations are in the area of interest?
- Which authorities in the area of interest espouse anti-host-nation government rhetoric?

PRODUCTS

3-37. The conduct and results of initial and continuous IPB are important prerequisites to developing requirements. They provide—

- Well-reasoned threat situation overlays, course of action statements, and event templates or matrices.
- Thorough analysis of civil considerations (areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, events [often referred to as ASCOPE]) for inclusion in the information collection plan.
- Continual and timely adjustment of the running estimate as the situation changes.
- Information and intelligence that support the development of the commander's decision points or actions (lines of operations or lines of effort).

3-38. The most useful product for developing requirements is the event template. A technique to better understand how the threat conducts operations is to use threat models to graphically depict their anticipated actions and related decisions. (FM 2-01.3 describes how to develop threat models.) The threat model is used to create an event template. The event template depicts the threat's actions on a timeline showing the steps through which threat activities advance while preparing to execute a task and mission. This graphic provides the staff with ways to create requirements for collection and to possibly interdict threat operations. (See figures 7-2 on page 7-4, 7-5 on page 7-8, and 7-8 on page 7-12 for examples of event templates.)

3-39. Once developed, the event template is a key product in developing the information collection plan. Likely threat locations, avenues of approach, infiltration routes, support areas, and areas of activity become NAIs or TAIs on which information collection assets and resources focus their collection efforts.

3-40. During operations against irregular or hybrid threats, the event template must be modified to address more than the predicted threat activity. For example—

- Within the AO, Army forces interact with additional organizations and the local population on a daily basis.
- In addition to the tasks performed by Army units, multinational units, and the host-nation military in the AO, the commander and staff must be aware of events occurring within the area of interest.

3-41. If the commander and staff choose to expand the event template, they require input from outside of the staff. The activities of interagency partners should be considered whenever possible. The commander and staff determine the activities to depict. Activities may include—

- Religious events.
- Government meetings.
- Reconstruction projects.
- Openings of government facilities, markets, schools, and clinics.
- Medical clinic activity (immunizations).
- Transportation improvements (work on roads).

Chapter 4

Developing Planning Requirements Tools

ROLE OF PLANNING REQUIREMENTS TOOLS

4-1. The planning requirements tools developed by the intelligence staff begin the process of synchronizing the information collection plan with the concept of operations and are updated as the concept of operations changes. The tools are used by the operations staff (in close collaboration with the intelligence staff) to develop the information collection plan. Developing requirements tools includes evaluating resources, developing a collection strategy, and developing supporting tools. (See figure 4-1 on page 4-3.)

EVALUATE RESOURCES

4-2. While reviewing collection assets during the MDMP, the staff also performs an evaluation of the collection assets using the following criteria: availability, capability, sustainability, and vulnerability.

AVAILABILITY

4-3. Staff members must know the collectors and PED enablers available at their echelon, as well as those at echelons above and below, and how to request and manage those assets. (See ADRP 2-0.) Combatant command and subordinate joint forces apportion joint assets to subordinate echelons. Corps and divisions allocate support from the apportioned assets to brigade combat teams (BCTs) and below. (See appendix B.) Staff members must understand the system of apportionment and allocation. They determine what joint assets are available by—

- Conducting collaboration and coordination early in the planning process.
- Analyzing the higher headquarters order and reviewing the various scheduling or tracking mechanisms.

CAPABILITY

4-4. The staff must know and consider practical capabilities and limitations of all unit organic assets. Capabilities include the following:

- **Range.** Range deals with the collector's ability to provide target coverage. When considering an asset's range, it is important to consider mission range (duration and distance) and how close the collection asset must be to the target to collect against it. Additionally, intelligence staffs consider communication requirements from the asset to the command post. The staff determines—
  - Ability to maneuver, including travel and support times.
  - Transit and dwell times, if the best asset is an unmanned aircraft system (UAS).
- **Day and night effectiveness.** Staffs consider factors such as available optics and any effects of thermal crossover.
- **Technical characteristics.** Each asset has time factors (such as set-up and tear-down times) for task accomplishment that must be considered. Other technical characteristics include the following:
  - Whether the sensor can see through fog or smoke.
  - The effects of the environment on the collection asset (including factors such as urban or rural terrain and soil composition).
  - Whether the asset can continue despite electronic attack.
- **Reporting timeliness.** Each asset is assigned an earliest time and a latest time information reporting is of value to the information collection plan, based on—
  - The established reporting criteria for each collection asset.
  - How long it takes to disseminate collected information to each requester.

- **Geolocation accuracy.** Accuracy implies reliability and precision. The asset must be capable of locating a target accurately enough to engage it with precision-guided munitions.
- **Durability.** Durability includes such factors as—
  - Whether the aircraft can launch in high winds or limited visibility.
  - Whether the prime mover can cross restricted terrain.
- **Threat activity.** The staff considers whether the collection asset can detect the expected threat activity.
- **Performance history.** Experienced staff officers know which information collection assets have been reliable in meeting different information requirements. Readiness rates, responsiveness, and accuracy over time may raise one collector's reliability factor.
- **PED enablers.** The staff considers whether the unit has the PED enablers required to support more flexible and responsive intelligence operations. (See ADRP 2-0.)

SUSTAINABILITY

4-5. Each collection asset has specific sustainment requirements; therefore, the staff considers the collection asset's sustainability for long-duration operations. The longer the collection period, the more difficult it is to find assets for continuous activity. Weather can significantly affect sustainability of certain collection assets.

VULNERABILITY

4-6. The staff must evaluate the collector's vulnerability to threat forces, not only in the target area but also along the entire route of travel. It is important to evaluate the threat's ability to locate, identify, and destroy collection assets. For example, a helicopter's capabilities may make it a suitable collection asset; however, its vulnerabilities could make it too risky to use if the enemy possesses surface-to-air missiles. Another consideration is the signature associated with the collection asset. For example, a UAS engine emits an uncommon noise that is distinctly identifiable and may alert the target they are under surveillance.

DEVELOP A COLLECTION STRATEGY

4-7. After thorough evaluation of availability, capability, sustainability, and vulnerability of collection assets, the operations and intelligence staffs develop a collection strategy. Although the strategy adopted will vary based on the mission and the information requirements to be satisfied, tasking organic assets should be considered first. The advantage to this is that the commander has the most control over these assets and they are generally more responsive than other supporting assets. If organic assets cannot satisfy a requirement, the staff may need to submit a request for support (collection) or request for information to higher or lateral headquarters. Layering collection assets is accomplished through cue, redundancy, and mix.

SUBMIT REQUESTS FOR SUPPORT (COLLECTION)

4-8. Information requirements generated during planning often require external resources to answer. When needed, requests for support (collection) from higher headquarters—such as for joint force, combatant command, or national assets—should be prepared and submitted through appropriate channels. Although external collection resources may be more capable than organic assets, those external assets may already be tasked against other information requirements, resulting in the requester's requirements going unmet. Various tasking documents levy information on collection resources. Some tasking mechanisms are joint force- or intelligence system-unique. Various manuals specify procedures and formats for requesting support from national systems or agencies. Combatant commands also modify, clarify, or add to these procedures in their local intelligence SOPs.

SUBMIT REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION

4-9. When the unit cannot satisfy a requirement through intelligence reach or its own assets, the intelligence staff composes and submits a request for information to the next higher echelon or lateral units.



Figure 4-1. Develop planning requirements tools

4-10. A request for information is initiated to respond to tactical requirements (critical information gaps) and is validated in accordance with the unit's SOP. For example: A BCT S-2 may submit a request for information confirming the size and composition of an enemy formation (no further information) reported by one of its battalions at a specific location. This would then be researched by the higher headquarters intelligence staff and answered immediately if the information or intelligence exists. If the information or intelligence does not exist, the request for information would form the justification to request joint or national support.

4-11. Requests for information are typically requested using an information management system that allows all other users can see the requests. That system allows analysts several echelons above the actual requester to become aware of the request and answer it. At each echelon, the requirement is validated and a determination made as to whether or not that echelon can satisfy the requirement. If an echelon cannot satisfy the requirement, it is passed to the next higher echelon.

4-12. Civil information is often not developed or held within military channels. Unified action partners are often the best sources to satisfy requirements for many types of civil information. Requests for civil information are also managed by the intelligence staff. Unified action partners operating in the AO may be queried directly by the appropriate staff. Unified action partners often maintain liaison at higher level staffs, and the normal request for information process may occur through those liaison elements.

MATCH RESOURCES TO INDICATORS

4-13. After evaluating available assets, the operations and intelligence staffs match these assets to SIRs. Each requirement is associated with its corresponding decision points and timelines. Starting at the point in time the commander requires intelligence to make a decision, the intelligence staff reverse-plans to account for dissemination, analysis, processing, collection, and tasking time. An effective tool used to link and synchronize the collection strategy with the expected flow of the operation is the information collection synchronization matrix. As part of matching assets to SIRs, the staff also considers cueing, redundancy, and mix.

Cueing

4-14. *Cueing* involves the use of one or more information collection assets to provide data that directs collection by other assets. For example, sweeping the AO electronically with a surveillance system can reveal activity that triggers direct collection by a more accurate sensor system. Cueing maximizes the efficient use of limited collection assets in support of multiple, often competing, information collection priorities. An effective strategy includes plans to create opportunities for cued collection.

4-15. For example: A BCT may plan to use a human intelligence (HUMINT) source 24 hours prior to a UAS launch to confirm or deny activity along a key corridor. If the source reports the absence of activity, the UAS may be redirected to another mission or used to confirm the absence of activity, depending on the relative priority of requirements. If the HUMINT source reports significant activity earlier than anticipated, the UAS mission may be accelerated to collect supporting details or retasked to another collection mission.

Redundancy

4-16. *Redundancy* planning as part of collection strategy development involves the use of several same-discipline (or same-capability) assets to cover the same target. Redundant tasking is appropriate against high-payoff targets when the probability of success by any one system is low. For example, if several signals intelligence (SIGINT) collectors target a designated emitter at different times, the probability of intercept improves, even if the emitter operates intermittently. Using redundant collection assets also improves the chance of accurate geolocation.

Mix

4-17. *Mix* means planning for complementary coverage by a combination of assets from multiple intelligence disciplines. Sensor mix increases the probability of collection and reduces the risk of successful enemy deception. It also can facilitate cueing and provides more complete reporting. For example, if scouts report activity within a known assembly area, SIGINT intercept of the associated logistic net might provide unit identity, subordination, and indications of future activity.

DEVELOP SPECIFIC INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

4-18. The intelligence staff develops SIRs for each PIR based on its group, the indicators, and related information requirements. (See paragraphs 3-27 through 3-28.) Developing SIRs requires the collection manager to be knowledgeable of the following:

- Capabilities of the available collection assets.
- Specificity of the information they provide.
- Time it takes to collect and report the information in relation to the specificity and timeliness requirements the commander and staff articulated with the LTIOV.

4-19. SIRs help the intelligence staff determine the right combinations of collection assets to provide the timely, specific, and relevant information required. SIRs also ensure that information collection taskings correlate with the PIRs and priorities for information collection. In addition, SIRs allow collection assets to work in combinations timed to achieve efficient results and reduce the possibility of being fooled by threat denial and deception efforts.

4-20. SIRs are developed for each information collection asset based on the capabilities of the asset and the expected threat activity. SIRs provide specific information about specific threat activity (or lack thereof) at specific locations. SIRs help collection assets provide information specific and timely enough to make a difference in answering the PIRs.

DEVELOP SUPPORTING TOOLS

4-21. The supporting tools are developed by the intelligence staff to help the operations staff develop the information collection plan. Both staffs work closely together to ensure the collection plan is synchronized with the concept of operations and updated as the concept of operations changes. Chapter 7 contains sample information collection matrices and information collection overlays for offensive, defensive, and stability missions. Supporting tools are—

- The information collection matrix.
- The information collection synchronization matrix.
- The information collection overlay.

INFORMATION COLLECTION MATRIX

4-22. The information collection matrix links PIRs with indicators, SIRs, NAIs, and TAIs. Constructed in a spreadsheet format and including individual work sheets as required, the matrix provides detailed collection and reporting requirements. The information collection matrix is not a tasking document. Although not published as part of the order, the matrix is a key tool used by both the intelligence staff and the operations staff in executing the information collection plan. It is maintained on the unit Web page and assists the intelligence staff in synchronizing internal information collection activities across echelons.

4-23. To create the information collection matrix, the intelligence staff requires several outputs from the MDMP. Initial and subsequent refinements to the following are required to complete the requirements matrix:

- **Concept of operations.** The *concept of operations* is a statement that directs the manner in which subordinate units cooperate to accomplish the mission and establishes the sequence of actions the force uses to achieve the end state (ADRP 5-0).
- **Commander's guidance for information collection.** The concept of operations, coupled with the commander's guidance for information collection, provides the intelligence staff with *how* the commander intends to use information collection to support the concept of operations.
- **Commander's critical information requirements.** CCIRs, mainly PIRs, are those requirements for which the information collection plan provides timely answers.
- **Initial task organization.** The initial task organization depicts assets available that the intelligence staff may consider requesting for tasking by the operations staff.
- **Apportionment, allocation, and distribution of Army and joint aerial assets.**
  - ***Apportionment***. The joint force commander determines the apportionment of aerial assets. *Apportionment,* in the general sense, is distribution of forces and capabilities as the starting point

for planning, etc. (JP 5-0). Specific apportionments (such as, air sorties and forces) are described as apportionment of air sorties and forces for planning. (See JP 5-0.) *Apportionment (air)* is determination and assignment of the total expected effort by percentage and/or by priority that should be devoted to various air operations for a given period of time. (See JP 5-0.)

- ***Allocation***. The joint force air component commander takes that apportionment and turns it into sorties to support priority ground forces in accordance with the joint force commander's intent. This process is called *allocation*, which is the distribution of limited forces and resources for employment among competing requirements (JP 5-0). *Allocation (air)* is the translation of the air apportionment decision into total numbers of sorties by aircraft type available for each operation or task. Thus, a corps or division is allocated joint ISR sorties.
- ***Distribution***. When the corps or division sends its allocated sorties to subordinate units, normally via the air support operations center or a tactical air control party, this process is called *distribution*. The distribution of joint assets provides additional information collection capabilities for inclusion into the information collection plan.
- See Appendix B for more information on the joint request process for aerial assets.

INFORMATION COLLECTION SYNCHRONIZATION MATRIX

4-24. The intelligence staff uses the information collection synchronization matrix to synchronize information collection tasks with the current threat assessment and friendly concept of operations. This product and process can synchronize and communicate information collection tasks horizontally and vertically across commands. However, it does not provide the detail needed to perform control of information collection assets through technical channels.

4-25. Figure 4-2 on pages 4-8 and 4-9 displays an example of an information collection synchronization matrix. The intelligence staff uses this matrix to accomplish the following:

- Ensure collection tasks are tied to the concept of operations in time and space, effectively linking information collection to it. The matrix is typically constructed in spreadsheet format and accompanied by an information collection overlay that graphically depicts the information the matrix contains.
- Synchronize information collection tasks the same way the operations staff uses the maneuver synchronization matrix to synchronize the overall unit scheme of maneuver.
- When necessary, brief the information collection plan and overlay to specific information collection assets. (This usually is done during operations predominated by stability tasks.)

4-26. Intelligence staffs develop and modify the matrix based on the current intelligence running estimate, enemy situation overlay, stated requirements, and event template or matrix. The matrix generally has five parts:

- Threat timeline.
- Friendly timeline.
- Information collection focus.
- Collection assets.
- Coverage timeline.

4-27. The information collection synchronization matrix coordinates the collection strategy with the planned friendly and predicted threat operations. The matrix depicts the NAIs from the event template and reflects timelines of expected threat activity from the event template and matrix. The matrix also provides the basic structure for completion of the information collection plan and is tied to a decision or decision points for the impending operation.

INFORMATION COLLECTION OVERLAY

4-28. The operations staff issues an information collection overlay depicting the information collection plan in graphic form as an appendix to annex L (Information Collection) to the operation order. (See figure 7-3 on page 7-5 and figure 7-6 on page 7-9.) Typical items on the overlay include—

- Friendly boundaries and phase lines.
- Reconnaissance handover lines.

- NAIs and TAIs.
- Limits of advance and limits of reconnaissance. (*Limits of reconnaissance* are constraints derived from higher headquarters orders that may designate a limit of advance affecting reconnaissance units. See FM 3-55.)
- Counterreconnaissance areas.
- Fire support coordination measures.
- Graphics depicting zone, area, or route reconnaissance missions.
- Route start points, release points, infiltration lanes, and checkpoints.
- Primary and alternate observation post locations.
- Ambulance exchange points and logistic release points.
- Planned or existing obstacles.
- Scan sectors for sensors.
- UAS flight paths.
- Retransmission locations.

PLANNING REQUIREMENTS BRIEFING TOOL

4-29. Many units create a graphic version of the planning requirements function for briefing purposes. The planning requirements briefing tool combines the information collection synchronization matrix, information collection overlay, and PIRs into one product. (See figure 4-3 on pages 4-10 and 4-11.)

WORKING AIDS FOR CREATING TOOLS

4-30. The intelligence staff uses several working aids that assist in creating planning requirements tools. Normally developed and refined during the MDMP, these working aids are not contained within the requirements planning tools or information collection plan.

NAMED AREA OF INTEREST MATRIX

4-31. The NAI matrix is used to synchronize information collection missions with NAIs or TAIs. The purpose of the NAI matrix is to ensure information collection assets are tasked to cover critical NAIs and TAIs during anticipated times of activity. (See figure 4-4 on page 4-12.)

NAMED AREA OF INTEREST WORK SHEET

4-32. For each NAI, the operations and intelligence staffs develop observation times and a task, a purpose, and SIRs for assets conducting information collection missions involving it. This information may be consolidated on an NAI work sheet. (See figure 4-5 on page 4-13.) It is crucial to focus the task on a clearly defined and achievable purpose.

NAMED AREA OF INTEREST OVERLAY

4-33. An NAI overlay visually depicts NAI locations. (See figure 4-6 on page 4-14.) The NAI overlay may also contain the task and purpose (*what* and *why*) of the NAI.



Figure 4-2. Sample information collection synchronization matrix



Figure 4-2. Sample information collection synchronization matrix (continued)



Figure 4-3. Sample planning requirements briefing tool



Figure 4-3. Sample planning requirements briefing tool (continued)



Figure 4-4. Sample named area of interest matrix

Named Area of Interest Work Sheet				
NAI	***Indicators***	***Course of Action Adoption Indicators***		
		COA 1	***COA 2***	***COA 3***
3022	BRDM-2s and BMP-2s	MECH IN CO attacks east followed by 2 MECH IN BNs on Route Packers.	MECH IN PLT attacks east followed by MECH IN CO on Route Packers.	MECH IN PLT attacks east followed by MECH IN CO on Route Packers.
3024	BMP-2s	MECH IN PLT attacks east followed by MECH IN CO on Route Niners.	MECH IN CO attacks west, then 3 MECH IN BNs attack east on Route Niners.	MECH IN PLT attacks east followed by MECH IN CO on Route Niners.
3028	BMP-2s, T-80s	MECH IN CO attacks east followed by 2 MECH IN BNs on Route Falcons.	MECH IN PLT attacks east followed by MECH IN CO on Route Falcons.	MECH IN PLT attacks east followed by MECH IN CO on Route Falcons.
3021	BRDM2s, BMP2s, T-80s, and 2S19	MECH IN CO, with artillery support, attacks east followed by 2 MECH IN BNs on Route Packers.	MECH IN PLT followed by MECH IN CO attacks east on Route Packers. Unit does not become decisively engaged. Initial artillery support lessens.	MECH IN PLT followed by MECH IN CO attacks east on Route Packers. Unit does not become decisively engaged. Initial artillery support lessens.
3024	BMP-2s, T-80s	MECH IN PLT followed by MECH IN CO attacks east on Route Packers. Unit does not become decisively engaged. Initial artillery support lessens.	MECH IN CO, with artillery support, attacks east followed by 3 MECH IN BNs on Route Niners.	MECH IN PLT followed by MECH IN CO attacks east on Route Niners. Unit does not become decisively engaged. Initial artillery support lessens.
3023	BMP-2s or BMP-2ss and 2S19s	MECH IN PLT followed by MECH IN CO attacks east on Route Niners. Unit does not become decisively engaged. Initial artillery support lessens.	MECH IN CO, with artillery support, attacks east followed by 3 MECH IN BNs attack east on Route Niners.	MECH IN PLT followed by MECH IN CO attacks east on Route Seahawks. Unit does not become decisively engaged. Initial artillery support lessens.
3025	BMP-2s or BMP-2ss and 2S19s	MECH IN PLT followed by MECH IN CO attacks east on Route Niners. Unit does not become decisively engaged. Initial artillery support lessens.	MECH IN CO, with artillery support, attacks east followed by 3 MECH IN BNs attacks east on Route Seahawks.	MECH IN PLT followed by MECH IN CO attacks east on Route Niners. Unit does not become decisively engaged. Initial artillery support lessens.
BN battalion CO company COA course of action		IN infantry MECH mechanized NAI named area of interest		PLT platoon

Figure 4-5. Sample named area of interest work sheet

Figure 4-6. Sample named area of interest overlay

Chapter 5
Assessing Collection

ASSESSMENT

5-1. *Assessment* is determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective (JP 3-0). Commanders, assisted by their staffs and subordinate commanders, continuously assess the operational environment, the progress of the operation, and the information collected by the assets executing the information collection plan. Based on their assessment, commanders direct adjustments to the information collection plan, thus ensuring the plan remains focused on providing information and intelligence products to assist in decisionmaking. Assessing collection involves assessing the information collection plan and assessing tactical task execution. Figure 5-1 on page 5-2 shows the tasks associated with assessing collection.

ASSESSING THE INFORMATION COLLECTION PLAN

5-2. The commander and staff continuously evaluate the information collection plan based on the assessment of results from reconnaissance missions, surveillance tasks, intelligence operations, and security operations. Collection assessment is particularly important during execution because situations change rapidly. Evaluation identifies updates required to keep the information collection plan synchronized with the overall operation. Together, commanders and staffs determine if CCIRs have been satisfied or are still relevant:

- **If CCIRs have been satisfied or are no longer relevant**, they are eliminated from the information collection plan.
- **If CCIRs have not been satisfied but are still relevant**, the intelligence staff coordinates with the operations staff during operations and intelligence working group meetings for additional assets and/or recommends adjustments to the current coverage.

5-3. The operations staff is deeply involved in assessing the operation as a whole and looks to the operations and intelligence working group's assessment of the information collection effort to assist in that assessment. Assessment is one of the working group's continuing activities to support directing and collecting. (See FM 3-55.) It is particularly important in enabling the evaluation of the information collection plan.

ASSESSING TACTICAL TASK EXECUTION

5-4. The staff performs the following steps when assessing the execution of tactical tasks:

- Monitor the tactical situation.
- Screen reporting to ensure the completion of tasks.
- Correlate reporting to requirements.
- Provide feedback to assets.
- Maintain synchronization with operations.
- Cue assets to other collection opportunities.
- Recommend retasking of assets.



Figure 5-1. Assessing collection

MONITOR THE TACTICAL SITUATION

5-5. Staffs track the progress of the operation against requirements and the information collection plan. The operation seldom progresses on the timelines assumed during planning and staff wargaming. The staff watches for changes in tempo that require changes in reporting times, such as LTIOVs. The intelligence and operations staffs coordinate any changes with all parties concerned, including commanders and appropriate staff elements. It is possible that the staff's assumptions about enemy courses of action will not prove entirely correct. The usual result is a change in requirements, as well as adjustments to the timelines. The staff may initiate the rapid decisionmaking synchronization process to accommodate changes in its assumptions or the situation. (See FM 6-0.)

SCREEN REPORTING TO ENSURE THE COMPLETION OF TASKS

5-6. The staff screens reporting to determine whether each collection task has been satisfied and screens each report for the following criteria:

- **Relevance.** Does the collected information actually answer the requirements associated with the information collection task? If not, can this information be used to satisfy other requirements?
- **Completeness.** Is essential information missing? (Refer to the original information collection task.)
- **Timeliness.** Has the asset reported by the LTIOV established in the original task?
- **Opportunities for cueing.** Can this asset or another asset take advantage of new information to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the overall information collection effort? If the report suggests an opportunity to cue other assets, the intelligence and operations staffs immediately cue them and record any new requirements in the appropriate planning requirements tool.

CORRELATE REPORTING TO REQUIREMENTS

5-7. The staff tracks which specific information collection task originates from which requirement to ensure the collected information is provided to the original requester and to all who need the information. For efficiency and timeliness, the staff ensures production tasks are linked to requirements. This allows the staff to determine which requirements have been satisfied and which require additional collection.

5-8. The staff addresses the following potential challenges:

- Large volumes of information that could inundate the intelligence analysis staff element. The intelligence staff may have trouble correlating each report to a requirement.
- Assembling information from multiple reports that partially satisfy a number of collection tasks.
- Routing information from reports that have nothing to do with the collection task to tasks the information might satisfy.
- Reports that do not refer to the task that drove the collection mission.
- Circular reporting or unnecessary message traffic that wastes valuable time.

5-9. Correlating information reporting to the original requirement and evaluating reports is key to effective requirements management. This quality control effort helps the staff ensure timely satisfaction of requirements. Requirements management includes dissemination of reporting and related information to original requesters and other users.

PROVIDE FEEDBACK TO ASSETS

5-10. The staff provides feedback to all collection assets on their mission effectiveness and to analysis elements on their production. Normally this feedback is given to the military intelligence leader or commander of the asset or staff element. Feedback reinforces whether collection or production satisfies the original task or request and provides guidance if it does not. Feedback is essential to maintaining information collection effectiveness and alerting leaders of deficiencies to be corrected.

5-11. Running estimates are important tools for assessing the information collection plan. They inform the staff of the status of collection on the CCIRs. Running estimates are even more effective when compared

with previous estimates that refer to the same time period. This rates the accuracy and relevancy of the prediction to what actually occurred.

MAINTAIN SYNCHRONIZATION WITH OPERATIONS

5-12. As execution progresses, the staff refines the estimate of when information is needed (the LTIOV, based on the decision point timeline in the order) with when the information is actually required. The staff stays alert to the need for recommending changes in the information collection plan because of these refinements. As the need for changes arises, the intelligence staff coordinates with the appropriate command post cells and staff elements to update products as required to refine the information collection plan. This may be as simple as updating timelines, or it may require that these products be completely redone. Sometimes it may require retasking information collection assets.

CUE ASSETS TO OTHER COLLECTION OPPORTUNITIES

5-13. The intelligence and operations staffs track the status of information collection assets, cueing them as necessary and teaming assets as appropriate. Cueing allows assets to take advantage of new information to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of their collection. For example, if a Soldier reports hearing tracked vehicles but cannot observe the vehicles due to the terrain, a UAS can be cued to observe the area for the presence of tracked vehicles.

RECOMMEND RETASKING OF ASSETS

5-14. *Retasking* is assigning an information collection asset a new task and purpose. It is done—

- Upon completion of its initial requirement.
- After the LTIOV, if the original requirement has not been satisfied and the LTIOV cannot be adjusted.
- On order to support a branch or sequel.
- To respond to variances in the situation. (See ADRP 5-0.)

5-15. The operations staff issues orders to retask assets, normally in consultation with the intelligence staff for assets controlled by the unit. In cases where the intelligence staff is coordinating with higher headquarters for additional assets, the intelligence staff may transmit the request for retasking resources, but the operations staff typically follows up through operations channels to the higher headquarters.

Chapter 6

Updating Planning Requirements Tools

STAFF ACTIONS DURING EXECUTION

6-1. Evaluation and assessment of collection reporting, production, and dissemination together identify updates required to keep information collection activities synchronized with the overall operation. As the tactical situation changes, the staff adjusts the planning requirements tools to effect this synchronization. This optimizes the collection and exploitation effort.

6-2. Determining satisfied requirements allows the staff to redirect assets to unfulfilled requirements. Whether modifying reporting requirements because of new reporting criteria, new or modified PIRs, loss of an asset, or changes in the mission, the staff recommends modifications to the information collection plan to fit the commander's needs. During modification of the information collection plan, the following considerations should be addressed:

- What assets need to be shifted?
- What is the new collection requirement?
- What is the target location?
- Must the asset move to a new location?
- What is the risk of moving the asset? Is the risk worth the potential gain of information?
- Does the collector functionally match the collection requirement based on the collector's capabilities?
- What and when does the collector report?
- How does the collector report?
- To whom does the collector report?

6-3. Updated IPB products and running estimates can be used as a baseline for refocusing the information collection effort. Information collection assets are retasked as appropriate for subsequent missions. Requirements are constantly updated to ensure information collection efforts are synchronized with current operations while also supporting future operations planning. As requirements are answered, the information collection plan and planning requirements tools are updated.

6-4. After receiving input from the commander and staff, the intelligence staff synchronizes new requirements with ongoing information collection activities and recommends adjustments to the information collection plan to the operations staff. The following steps are performed when updating planning requirements tools:

- Eliminate satisfied requirements.
- Develop and add new requirements.
- Transition to the next operation.

6-5. These steps are collaborative efforts by the intelligence and operations staffs. Some steps predominately engage the intelligence staff while others engage the operations staff. Steps may require coordination with other staff elements, and the entire intelligence and operations working group may be engaged, at times. (See figure 6-1 on page 6-2.)

ELIMINATE SATISFIED REQUIREMENTS

6-6. While evaluating information collection activities, the intelligence staff identifies satisfied requirements. Satisfied requirements and requirements no longer relevant, even if unsatisfied, are eliminated during this step.



Figure 6-1. Update planning requirements tools

DEVELOP AND ADD NEW REQUIREMENTS

6-7. Unanticipated situations—such as the loss of a collection asset or signal—may not only disrupt the collection task but also require dynamic retasking of other assets. (See paragraph 6-11.) The best method of preparing for dynamic retasking is preparing battle drills for the command post SOPs.

6-8. Battle drills can be developed by asking "what if" questions and then proceeding systematically through the logical process that should follow. Although they cannot foresee all possible circumstances, the intelligence and operations staffs can be better prepared by developing drills that cover the most common occurrences. If a retasking results in a change in an asset's mission, its movement, or a change in its function in the scheme of intelligence collection, the operations staff issues a fragmentary order or instructions over command or operations channels.

6-9. As the operation unfolds and the situation develops, commanders generate new requirements that are prioritized against remaining requirements. The intelligence staff—

- Consolidates new requirements with existing requirements when possible.
- Reprioritizes requirements when necessary.
- Evaluates resources based on the consolidated listing and priorities.
- Makes appropriate recommendations to the commander and operations staff.

IMMEDIATE AND DYNAMIC RETASKING

6-10. *Immediate retasking* involves effecting changes or making additions to information collection tasks assigned to an asset after planning but before it begins executing the mission. The staff can order minor immediate retaskings without modifying the information collection plan. Branches and sequels to the order should have been factored into the information collection plan during planning and preparation for the overall operation. Immediate retasking is accomplished more easily if branches and sequels are considered in the original plan.

6-11. *Dynamic retasking* involves effecting changes in the mission of a collection asset while it is executing its mission. It involves actually stopping the ongoing collection and redirecting the asset to other targets.

REQUEST SUPPORT FROM JOINT AERIAL ASSETS

6-12. Appendix B contains procedures for requesting joint aerial assets.

TRANSITION TO THE NEXT OPERATION

6-13. Transitions mark a change of focus between phases or between the ongoing operation and execution of a branch or sequel. Shifting priorities between offensive, defensive, and stability tasks also involves a transition. Transitions require planning and preparation well before their execution to maintain the momentum and tempo of operations. Typically, the task organization evolves to meet changing conditions; however, transition planning must also account for changes in mission. Commanders continuously assess the situation and task-organize and cycle their forces to retain the initiative. They strive to achieve changes in emphasis without incurring an operational pause. For planning requirements and assessing collection, a transition may involve staff actions ranging from adjusting the information collection plan to participating in developing a completely new plan. The unit may need to rely on higher echelon collection for a time as the unit repositions assets and changes to task organization (as well as command and support relationships) are completed.

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PART THREE

Considerations for Specific Tasks and Unique Environments

Chapter 7

Considerations for Offensive, Defensive, and Stability Tasks

SUCCESS AND DECISIONMAKING DURING EXECUTION

7-1. The techniques associated with information collection do not drastically differ whether conducting offensive, defensive, or stability tasks. The difference lies in the tempo at which offensive and defensive tasks are conducted versus the tempo at which stability tasks are conducted. In operations where offensive and defensive tasks predominate, the activities of the operations process and commander's decisionmaking are accelerated to match the quickly changing conditions.

7-2. Commanders and staffs follow the rapid decisionmaking and synchronization process to make decisions during execution. It is routinely employed when the MDMP not timely enough for mission execution. This technique is used by leaders to focus on executing rather than planning. The rapid decisionmaking and synchronization process is based on an existing order and seeks an acceptable solution, while the MDMP seeks an optimal solution. (See FM 6-0.)

7-3. Success in stability tasks is measured in far different terms from success in the offense and defense. Time may be the ultimate arbiter of a stability mission's success: time to bring safety and security to an embattled populace; time to provide for the essential, immediate humanitarian needs of the people; time to restore basic public order and a semblance of normalcy to life; and time to rebuild the institutions of government and market economy that provide the foundations for enduring peace and stability.

ECHELONED APPROACH AND INTELLIGENCE HANDOVER LINES

7-4. In the offense or defense, the commander attacks or defends in depth. Information collection adopts this principle by using a phased, echeloned approach to collecting information to satisfy requirements. Each echelon conducting information collection plays a critical role in the success of any military operation. There are interdependencies at each echelon for the horizontal and vertical integration of collected information and the resulting intelligence, sensor feeds, and reporting in support to commanders and staffs. Interdependent relationships exist from the lowest tactical echelon to the highest strategic-level agencies and centers; no one echelon can do it all. Commanders require intelligence operations to provide information that is timely, accurate, relevant, and in sufficient detail to enable situational understanding and effective decisionmaking.

7-5. In the offense and defense, units should use an intelligence handover line to effect the echeloned approach. The intelligence handover line is a control measure that establishes areas within which each echelon is responsible for collecting information. It is much like a limit of reconnaissance and based on the unit's AO.

7-6. Assigning an AO to a unit includes the authority to collect information within it. Intelligence handover lines are developed to deconflict collection efforts between echelons and reduce the likelihood of duplication occurring. Several factors, such as the following, affect the location and designation of intelligence handover lines:

- The unit's organic intelligence collection capability.
- Size and proficiency of the intelligence staff.
- Availability of PED capabilities.
- The unit's authority to task or request support from nonorganic resources.

7-7. Intelligence handover lines are established to—

- Facilitate coordination between a unit and its subordinates.
- Direct units to detect and track threat units and high-payoff targets in their areas.
- Transfer collection responsibility for portions of the AO from one echelon to another.

7-8. A unit may define the intelligence handover line either dynamically or conceptually. The dynamic definition is more useful in a rapidly changing situation involving lower echelon units. For example, a division may set the intelligence handover line 12 kilometers in front of its committed brigades' forward line of own troops. This technique requires continuous situation updates from subordinate units. In most other circumstances, the intelligence handover line coincides with a phase line. Figure 7-1 depicts intelligence handover lines tied to phase lines for a BCT and division.

OFFENSIVE TASK CONSIDERATIONS

7-9. An *offensive task* is a task conducted to defeat or destroy enemy forces and seize terrain, resources, and population centers (ADRP 3-0). The purpose of the offense is to impose the commander's will on the enemy. Figures 7-2 on page 7-4, 7-3 on page 7-5, and 7-4 on page 7-7 depict samples of an event template, an information collection overlay, and part of an information collection matrix associated with an offensive task. Conducting offensive tasks may—

- Deprive the threat of resources.
- Seize decisive terrain.
- Deceive or divert the threat.
- Develop intelligence.
- Fix a threat in position.

7-10. Offensive tasks are either force-oriented or terrain-oriented. Force-oriented tasks focus on the threat. Terrain-oriented tasks focus on seizing and retaining control of the terrain and facilities. A commander's information requirements for offensive tasks commonly include—

- Locations, composition, equipment, strengths, and weaknesses of the defending enemy force, including high-payoff targets and enemy information collection capabilities.
- Locations of possible enemy assembly areas.
- Locations of enemy indirect-fire weapons systems and units.
- Locations of gaps and assailable flanks.
- Locations of landing zones for friendly and enemy air assaults.
- Locations of enemy air defense gun and missile systems.
- Locations of enemy electronic warfare systems.
- Effects of weather and terrain on current and projected operations.
- Numbers, routes, and direction of movement of dislocated civilians.
- Withdrawal routes for enemy forces.
- Anticipated timelines for the enemy's most likely course of action and other probable courses of action.
- Locations of enemy command posts, fire direction control centers, electronic warfare sites, and target acquisition sensor and target fusion sites and the frequencies they are using.



Figure 7-1. Sample intelligence handover lines



Figure 7-2. Sample offensive event template



Figure 7-3. Sample offensive information collection overlay

7-11. See ADRP 3-90 and FM 3-90-1 for doctrine on offensive tactics. See FM 2-01.3 for additional information requirements associated with offensive tasks.

7-12. Figure 7-4 shows a sample information collection matrix for a PIR associated with an offensive task. Information collection matrices for all decisive action tasks display information as follows:

- **Column 1** states the PIR. Units may determine that the best way to manage the requirements matrix is for each sheet to contain one PIR. This technique provides a single page containing the collection strategy for each PIR.
- **Column 2** contains indicators associated with the PIR. (See paragraphs 3-29 through 3-31.)
- **Column 3** contains SIRs associated with each indicator. Each requirement, coupled with the collection strategy, should contain all information needed by the intelligence staff to develop supporting SIRs. As the intelligence staff develops SIRs, the staff should coordinate the BCT, division, and corps intelligence and operations staffs, including supporting analysts, to gain an understanding of the specifics required to support planning. One technique is for intelligence staffs to develop SIR sets while operations staffs develop the collection strategy for each requirement and the general scheme of maneuver. (See paragraphs 3-29 through 3-31.)
- **Column 4** contains the NAIs or TAIs associated with each SIR. NAIs and TAIs each have an associated task and purpose statement explaining *what* is to be conducted by the observer and *why* it is essential for accomplishment. The staff may develops several types of NAIs based on the situation in the AO and the types of activity for observation. When conducting a counterinsurgency, the following types of NAIs may be appropriate:
  - ***Counter-improvised explosive device NAIs***—NAIs at tier-1 locations where improvised explosive device emplacement typically occurs.
  - ***Support zones***—NAIs at locations where insurgent groups have unlimited freedom of movement and where caches, safe houses, and other supplies are located.
  - ***High-value individual NAIs***—NAIs at targeted high-value individuals' pattern of life locations.
  - ***Infrastructure***—NAIs at key infrastructure locations.
- **Column 5** contains the starting time and ending time for collection. These times are based on the LTIOV and the capabilities and limitations of available information collection assets. Additionally, the time required to process and exploit the collected information (for example, translation of SIGINT intercepts, exploitation of imagery, drafting of HUMINT reports) is considered when developing the collection end time. The LTIOV is the absolute latest time the information can be used by the commander in making the decision the PIR supports. The LTIOV can be linked to time, an event, or a point in the operation.
- **Remaining columns** contain organic resources available for the intelligence staff to recommend for tasking by the operations staff. Also included are requested collection resources whose support has been confirmed by higher headquarters.

PIRs	Indicators	SIRs	NAIs	Time	BCT Assets						IMINT	SIGINT	HUMINT	Division				Corps	
					1st BN	2d BN	1-1 CAV	1-14 FA	52d BEB	52d BSB	Shadow	Prophet/LLVI	HCT	IMINT	SIGINT	ELINT	HUMINT	RC-12	Predator UAS
PIR 1: Where are the Donovian and BFB reconnaissance teams opposing 1/52 ABCT?	DRT elements consisting of 5 to 7 man teams	Report composition, disposition, strength, and activity of enemy movement consisting of at least 1 BRDM, 1 BMP	3009, 3017	H-1 to H+2	X		X					X			X				
			3004, 3005, 3006			X	X					X			X				
	Enemy movement consisting of at least 1 BRDM	Report composition, disposition, strength, and activity of DRT elements consisting of 5 to 7 man teams	3012, 3014, 3015, 3016	H-1 to H+3	X		X					X			X				
			3019, 3020, 3021			X	X					X			X				

ABCT	armored brigade combat team	CAV	cavalry	LLVI	low-level voice intercept
BCT	brigade combat team	DRT	division reconnaissance team	NAI	named area of interest
BEB	brigade engineer battalion	ELINT	electronic intelligence	PIR	priority intelligence requirement
BFB	Bilasuvar Freedom Brigade	FA	field artillery	SIGINT	signals intelligence
BMB	tracked infantry fighting vehicle	HCT	human intelligence collection team	SIR	specific information requirement
BN	battalion	H-hour	specific hour at which a particular operation commences	UAS	unmanned aircraft system
BRDM	wheeled reconaissance vehicle	HUMINT	human intelligence		
BSB	brigade support battalion	IMINT	imagery intelligence		

Figure 7-4. Sample offensive information collection matrix

DEFENSIVE TASK CONSIDERATIONS

7-13. A *defensive task* is a task conducted to defeat an enemy attack, gain time, economize forces, and develop conditions favorable for offensive or stability tasks (ADRP 3-0). Defensive tasks alone normally cannot achieve a decision. Their purpose is to create conditions for a counteroffensive that allows Army forces to regain the initiative. Other reasons for conducting defensive tasks include—

- Retaining decisive terrain or denying a vital area to the enemy.
- Attritting or fixing the enemy as a prelude to offensive tasks.
- Surprise action by the enemy.
- Increasing the enemy's vulnerability by forcing the enemy commander to concentrate subordinate forces.

7-14. Figures 7-5 on pages 7-8, 7-6 on page 7-9, and 7-7 on page 7-10 depict samples of an event template, an information collection overlay, and part of an information collection matrix associated with a defensive task. A commander's information requirements for defensive tasks commonly include—

- Locations, composition, equipment, strengths, and weaknesses of the enemy force.
- Enemy reconnaissance objectives or goals.
- Locations of possible enemy assembly areas.
- Location of enemy indirect fire weapons systems and units.
- Location of gaps between echelons and between units within an echelon, assailable flanks (once the attack is underway), and other enemy weaknesses.
- Location of areas for enemy helicopter and parachute assaults.
- Location of artillery and air defense gun and missile systems.
- Location of enemy electronic warfare systems.
- Location, numbers, and intentions of civilian populations.
- Effects of weather and terrain on current and projected operations.
- Numbers, routes, and direction of movement of dislocated civilians.
- Anticipated timeline for the enemy's most likely course of action.

7-15. See ADRP 3-90 and FM 3-90-2 for doctrine on defensive tactics. See FM 2-01.3 for additional information requirements associated with defensive tasks.



Figure 7-5. Sample defensive event template



Figure 7-6. Sample defensive information collection overlay

PIRs	Indicators	SIRs	NAIs	Time	BCT Assets: 1st BN	2d BN	1-1 CAV	1-14 FA	52d BEB	52d BSB	IMINT: Shadow	SIGINT: Prophet/LLVI	HUMINT: HCT	Division: IMINT	SIGINT	ELINT	HUMINT	Corps: RC-12	Predator UAS
PIR 1: Where are the Donovian and BFB reconnaissance teams and indirect fire assets that target 1/52 ABCT?	DRT elements consisting of 5 to 7 man teams	Report composition, disposition, strength, and activity of enemy movement consisting of at least 1 BRDM, 1 BMP	3009 3017	H-1 to H+2	X		X					X			X				
			3004 3005			X	X					X			X				
	Enemy movement consisting of at least 1 BRDM	Report composition, disposition, strength, and activity of DRT elements consisting of 5 to 7 man teams	3006	H-1 to H+3	X		X					X			X				
			3012			X	X					X			X				
	Identification of BM-21, 2S19, 9A52, IL-220	Report composition, disposition, strength, and activity of BM-21 (wheeled 122-mm MRL), 2S19 (SP 152-mm howitzer), 9A52 (wheeled 300-mm MRL), and IL-220 (artillery locating radar)	3015	H-1 to H+3				X								X			
			3016					X								X			
			3014					X								X			
			3019					X								X			

ABCT armored brigade combat team
BCT brigade combat team
BEB brigade engineer battalion
BFB Bilasuvar Freedom Brigade
BMP tracked infantry fighting vehicle
BN battalion
BRDM wheeled reconaissance vehicle
BSB brigade support battalion
CAV cavalry
DRT division reconnaissance team
ELINT electronic intelligence
FA field artillery
HCT human intelligence collection team
H-hour specific hour at which a particular operation commences
HUMINT human intelligence
IMINT imagery intelligence
LLVI low-level voice intercept
MRL multiple rocket launcher
NAI named area of interest
PIR priority intelligence requirement
SIGINT signals intelligence
SIR specific information requirement
UAS unmanned aircraft system

Figure 7-7. Sample defensive information collection matrix

STABILITY TASK CONSIDERATIONS

7-16. *Stability* is an overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential government services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (See JP 3-0.) Stability tasks address societal factors that may affect accomplishing a mission. In operations where these tasks predominate, these tasks are often key, if not essential, tasks. One example is when Army forces conduct stability tasks to support a host-nation or an interim government or as part of a transitional military authority when no government exists. Another is a mission where stability tasks help to establish or maintain a safe and secure environment by training or resourcing the host-nation security forces and facilitating reconciliation among local or regional adversaries. Figures 7-8 on page 7-12, 7-9 on page 7-13, and 7-10 on page 7-14 show a sample event template, information collection overlay, and information collection matrix associated with a stability task.

7-17. Information needed to accomplish stability tasks usually falls under the civil considerations mission variable. However the wide variety of societies and cultures Army forces may encounter precludes establishing a single checklist of factors to consider. That said, the following list provides a starting point for organizing this information into categories:

- Demographics.
- Economy.
- Culture and customs.
- Threats and adversaries, such as criminals and insurgents.
- Formal and informal leaders.
- How people communicate.
- Civil services.
- Other aspects of a society.

7-18. The information collection effort provides information the entire staff uses to provide products and assessments to support situational understanding. For each stability mission, information collection is focused to provide the relevant information the commander and staff require to make decisions. The following is a basic (but not all-inclusive) description of what the information collection effort does to support conducting stability tasks:

- Identify insurgents, threats, adversaries, and other impediments to the unit's accomplishment of its mission.
- Identify the natural or manmade hazards that exist with the unit's AO.
- Provide the foundational information needed to assess the establishment of a safe and secure environment.
- Identify areas of conflict among social, religious, or ethnic groups within the AO. This must be done by city to be most effective.
- Identify the areas of conflict among local, regional, and national organizations, groups, and factions, and how these are tied to political, social, and economic unrest.
- Identify unofficial, religious, and political leaders locally, regionally, and nationally.
- Provide the information needed to assess the effectiveness of civil-military operations projects.
- Identify the newspaper, radio, and television services that service populations within the AO, including their ranges and any specific ethnic, religious, or political affiliation.
- Provide the information needed to assess the establishment or rebuilding of political, legal, social, and economic institutions.
- Provide the information needed to assess the ability of the legitimate civil authority to assume responsibility for governance.
- Constant awareness and shared understanding of civil considerations are crucial to the long-term success of stability tasks. The intelligence staff classifies civil considerations into logical groups (such as, tribal, political, religious, ethnic, and government) based on the mission and situation. This information is refined further by the information collected during collection activities. These groups are evaluated, graphically portrayed, maintained, and updated. Because the populace is rarely homogeneous, sentiments exhibited by different population segments may vary in different geographical areas.
- Commanders typically visualize stability tasks along lines of effort. A *line of effort* is a line that links multiple tasks using the logic of purpose rather than geographical reference to focus efforts toward establishing operational and strategic conditions (ADRP 3-0). For stability tasks, commanders may consider linking primary stability tasks to their corresponding line of effort.

DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES TASK CONSIDERATIONS

7-19. Army defense support of civil authorities operations encompass all support provided by the components of the Army to civil authorities within the United States and its possessions and territories. This includes support provided by the Regular Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard. Army forces frequently conduct defense support of civil authorities operations in response to requests from federal, state, local, and tribal authorities for domestic incidents, emergencies, disasters, designated law enforcement support, and other domestic activities. (See ADRP 3-28.)

7-20. When Army intelligence personnel, assets, or capabilities are needed to provide intelligence support to defense support of civil authorities operations, specific authorization from the Secretary of Defense is required for both the mission and use of those military intelligence resources. The Secretary of Defense authorization will stipulate that a military intelligence element supporting defense support of civil authorities operations is subject to Executive Order 12333, applicable Department of Defense and Service regulations and policies, and intelligence oversight rules, as well as any other mission-specific restrictions. Due to the complexities associated with intelligence support to defense support of civil authorities, readers should refer to TC 2-91.7 when assigned this mission.



Figure 7-8. Sample stability event template



Figure 7-9. Sample stability information collection overlay

PIR	Indicators	Specific Information Requirements	NAI	Start Time	End Time	XX – Primary / BCT: 1st Battalion	2 d Battalion	3d Battalion	Q36/Q37	LCMR	Engineer	Recon	Shadow FMV	BCT HUMINT	BCT CI	Prophet	R – Request / Division & Higher: FMV	HUMINT	CI	COMINT	IMINT	MTI
What insurgent cells are conducting attacks that destabilize BCT area of operations?	Identification of agitators, insurgents, or criminal organizations, their supporters, & sympathizers, suddenly appearing in or move from an area.	Report— • Insurgent meeting locations. • Activities of known insurgents & associates in the area. • Confirmed or suspected bed-down locations.	3101	0800	2400	X X					X X	X X	X X	X X	X X	X X	R	R	R	R	R	R
	• Evidence of increased foot and vehicle traffic. • Increased travel within and into remote or isolated areas. • Apartments, houses, or buildings being rented but not lived in as homes.	Report— • Physical terrain characteristics facilitating insurgent operations (abandoned houses, public buildings, or schools). • Population demographics & conditions that allow insurgents to operate in area. • Locations of safe houses, garage assembly points, training areas, or insurgent-aligned businesses.	3118, 3116	0600	2400	X X	X X	X X			X X	X X	X X	X X	X X	X X	R	R	R			R
	• Evidence of increased foot and vehicle traffic. • Increased travel within and into remote or isolated areas. • Apartments, houses, or buildings being rented but not lived in as homes.	Report— • Family members of known insurgents. • Locations of recently released detainees who have past insurgent affiliation. • On host-nation security force members who have past affiliation with insurgents. • Any insurgent activity or reflections associated with vehicles. • Human-derived information on and descriptions of insurgent vehicles.	3118, 3116, 3101	0600	2400	X X	X X	X X			X X	X X	X X	X X	X X	X X	R	R	R	R	R	R

BCT brigade combat team
CI counterintelligence
COMINT communications intelligence
FMV full-motion video
HUMINT human intelligence
IMINT imagery intelligence
LCMR lightweight countermortar radar
MTI moving target indicator
NAI area of interest
PIR priority intelligence requirement
recon reconnaissance

Figure 7-10. Sample stability information collection matrix

Chapter 8
Considerations for Unique Environments

SIGNIFICANCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS

8-1. The geographic range of U.S. interests in the world today requires Army forces to be prepared to fight and win in all types of environments. Army tactical units may be committed to battle in areas where severe weather, climate, and terrain affect military operations, including the intelligence mission. In addition to the physical effects on the individual Soldier, environmental extremes limit information collection capabilities. Regardless of environmental conditions, commanders need information for decisionmaking. This chapter covers environments in which operations may require special tactics, techniques, or equipment.

SUPPORT IN URBAN ENVIRONMENTS

8-2. *Urban operations* are military operations conducted in a topographical complex and adjacent natural terrain where manmade construction and high population density are the dominant features. (See FM 3-06 for Army doctrine on urban operations and considerations for planning requirements and assessing collection to support them. See FM 2-01.3 for general considerations for developing requirements and indicators in support of planning requirements and assessing collection.) The following discussion addresses the considerations for information collection in an urban environment.

INFORMATION SOURCES IN URBAN ENVIRONMENTS

8-3. As in any environment, every Soldier in an urban environment is an information collector. Soldiers conducting patrols, manning observation posts, manning checkpoints, or even convoying supplies along a main supply route can serve as the commander's eyes and ears. The challenge for intelligence professionals is to understand what types of information Soldiers performing different tasks and missions can provide to an understanding of the overall situation, how to get them to report, and how to leverage that information into situational understanding.

8-4. This discussion briefly addresses some of the types of information Soldiers with different specialties can provide to the intelligence staff during urban operations. It is essential to properly brief Soldiers so they are aware of their information collection tasks prior to their missions and to debrief them immediately upon completion of their missions. Prompt debriefing captures information while it is still current in their minds. It also places the information into the intelligence system sooner, increasing the likelihood that it can be used for further action. Some examples of debriefing techniques are listed in FM 2-91.6. This cycle (brief-mission-debrief-intelligence/understanding of the current situation) is continuous throughout operations.

8-5. Table 8-1 on pages 8-2 and 8-3 lists potential information that may be gained from Soldiers of different specialties or organizations. Table 8-2 on page 8-4 lists potential information available from nonmilitary organizations.

Table 8-1. Information possibly available from military sources

Air defense artillery
■ Current threat posed by enemy unmanned aircraft systems, cruise missiles and rockets, mortars, and missiles. ■ May have secondary non-air-and-missile defense missions, such as observing named areas of interest or conducting urban patrols with supported units. ■ When not used for air and missile defense missions, may be employed along the urban perimeter to detect unusual or unauthorized traffic into or out of the urban area at night.
Aviation
■ Whether air operations are feasible in a given urban environment. ■ Gun camera video and surveillance systems carried by aircraft provide timely, thorough, and on-demand information. ■ Observation of threat forces and activities, from tracking individual vehicles through city streets to determining locations of enemy obstacles in the urban environment.
Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
■ Estimates on the effects of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear use in urban environments as well as the location, types, and potential effects of toxic industrial materials. ■ Identify chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazards that Soldiers may not normally recognize. ■ Assist in determining if a chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear hazard exists as part of the urban environment or is a deliberate weaponized attack.
Civil affairs
■ Local-national sentiments towards U.S. and multinational forces and policies. ■ Local-area assessments that focus on the local geography, political geography, history, people, labor situation, and legal system. ■ Civil reconnaissance to collect information related to civil considerations. (See FM 3-57.)
Engineers
■ Information about the terrain, threat engineer activity, obstacles, and weather effects. ■ Information on the effects of structures on the operation, bridge weight class and conditions, and most likely obstacle locations and composition. ■ Assistance in assessing potential collateral damage by analyzing risks of damage caused by the release of dangerous forces, power grid and water source stability, and the viability of sewage networks. ■ Standard urban intelligence preparation of the battlefield products and operational decision aids. ■ Products such as no-fire area overlays (hospitals, churches), trafficability overlays, target packages, refugee tracking products, line-of-sight surveys, reverse line-of-sight overlays, slope overlays, and critical infrastructure overlays, or assistance in creating them. ■ Specialized maps in the scales needed for operations in urban environments. ■ Assistance in creating special enemy decision support template products. ■ Products may be produced in either vector or digital format. ***Note***. Information on topographic engineer products and services can be found at the Topographic Engineering Center Web site.
Explosive ordnance disposal
■ Types of munitions threat forces may use. ■ Effects of munitions threat forces may use. ■ Stand-off distances for threat munitions. ■ Methods of threat munitions employment. ***Note***. Munitions may range from conventional land mines to all sorts of improvised explosive devices, such as, car bombs, booby-trapped artillery shells, remotely detonated homemade bombs, and suicide vests.
Human terrain teams
■ Operationally relevant social science research and an embedded knowledge capability to establish a coherent, analytical socio-cultural framework for conducting operations. ■ Assistance in building relationships with local leaders and power brokers. This can assist in gaining local, regional, socio-cultural, economic, and political insight.

Table 8-1. Information possibly available from military sources (continued)

Medical
■ Potential health threats, including disease outbreaks that may affect friendly forces or detainees. ■ Assistance in coordinating medical surveys to pinpoint existing hospitals, clinics, sanitariums, blood banks, pharmaceutical industries, medical supply warehouses, and veterinary and public health facilities, as well as to identify key indigenous medical personnel. ■ Information on the threat medical status, which discloses— ❑ Threat strengths and weaknesses. ❑ Attitudes of threat prisoners and detainees undergoing treatment. ❑ Type and utility of captured medical supplies. ❑ The use of chemical or biological weapons.
Military information support operations
■ Understanding of the local populace, including cultural information and the effects threat operations are having on the local populace. ■ The psychological effects that U.S. military activities may have on the local-national population.
Military police
■ Conduct any of the following missions: ❑ Area security operations. ❑ Maneuver and support operations. ❑ Internment and resettlement. ❑ Law and order operations. ❑ Liaison with local-national law enforcement officials. ■ Conduct police intelligence operations and ensure information collected during the conduct of military police functions is provided as input to the intelligence collection effort. ■ Maintain a detainee information database; information from this database can be used when constructing link diagrams and association matrixes. ■ Synchronize their efforts with intelligence personnel to determine releasability of detainees.
Scouts, snipers, and other surveillance and reconnaissance personnel
■ Scouts and reconnaissance patrols can provide— ❑ Grid coordinates of key locations for future use, such as landmarks—preferably ones that are visible from overhead (such as road intersections). ❑ A physical description of the key location. ■ Snipers are trained observers who operate in a stealthier mode with the intent to remain unobserved. They can provide— ❑ Spot reports to clarify a situation. ❑ Identity of probable leaders in a gathering of people. ❑ Gender of individuals, the size of a group, and any equipment they may be carrying. ***Note.*** When employed in a reconnaissance role (active collection), these Soldiers tend to be most useful when accompanied by an interpreter who allows them to interact with people they encounter, which allows them to better assess the situation. ■ The presence of patrols in urban areas, particularly while conducting stability tasks, may directly influence what they observe. Insurgent and local nationals may change their habits or actions either consciously or subconsciously when friendly patrols are in their area.
Special operations forces
■ Provide valuable, real-time information on topics such as the current situation, local nationals, and the culture of the local population. ■ A historical database of after action reviews and lessons learned for every mission a special operations force team conducts.
Transportation and logistics
■ Status of lines of communications. ■ Civilian population movements. ■ Impact of weather on movement. ■ Notable activity in populated areas.

Table 8-2. Information possibly available from nonmilitary sources

Civilian linguists and local hires
■ Local cultural understanding. ■ Current sentiments of the local population and local-national authorities. ■ Identity of key individuals or groups who might be a threat to mission success. ***Note***. All information provided by these sources must be carefully evaluated and placed into context, based on the reliability, credibility, and biases of the individual or group.
Intergovernmental organizations
■ This category includes such agencies as the International Criminal Police Organization (also called INTERPOL), United Nations, or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (also called NATO). ■ Provide assessments (upon request) regarding the— ❑ Needs of the local populace. ❑ Ability of the infrastructure to enable their support or aid to be effectively provided. ❑ General security situation. ❑ General stability of the area.
Local-national authorities
■ **Politicians** usually know their populations very well and can provide detailed socio-cultural information on the populace within their region of control, such as— ❑ Economic strengths and weaknesses. ❑ Religious, ethnic, and tribal breakdowns. ■ **Police** can provide information on the following within their operational areas: ❑ Local criminal organizations. ❑ Religious, ethnic, and tribal breakdowns. ❑ Key terrain. ■ **Fire department** personnel often have ready access to— ❑ Blueprints of the structures within their precincts. ❑ Information on fire escapes and other information related to building safety. ❑ Detailed information on the structural composition of buildings and the fire threat in individual buildings or whole blocks of a city. ■ **Public works** personnel are uniquely familiar with the infrastructure of the city. They can provide information on— ❑ Critical points in the city that must be secured in order for public services to be maintained. ❑ Avenues of approach throughout the city, especially underground service passages and sewer and drainage systems. ■ **City halls** are typically repositories of the following information: ❑ Detailed maps of the city. ❑ Key city infrastructure information. ❑ Blueprints of the buildings in the city. ***Note***. These authorities may be biased for any number of reasons and their advice is almost certainly slanted in their own long-term favor.

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS IN URBAN ENVIRONMENTS

8-6. The fluid nature of the urban environment creates a need for reliable and timely intelligence. Information needed to develop this intelligence is difficult to acquire. The effects of concentrations of buildings on information collection efforts, the complexity and difficulty of providing specific details on the urban threat, and the lack of cultural information can compound the challenges to the collection of information in an urban environment.

8-7. With knowledge of U.S. collection techniques, threats can use the environment to impede information collection efforts. The amount of detail that needs to be collected in the urban environment and constant attention to focusing on the details that are significant in urban analysis in a particular situation creates further challenges for intelligence professionals. Current analysis tools and methods must be appropriately focused and developed to the level of detail required for the urban environment.

8-8. Table 8-3 presents the considerations for intelligence operations in an urban environment.

Table 8-3. Considerations for intelligence operations in an urban environment

Counterintelligence
■ Conduct screening operations to identify personnel who may be of counterintelligence interest or have counterintelligence leads. ***Note.*** As appropriate, those inquiries are pursued separately from standard collections and debriefings if they become investigations or operations. ■ When operating with the local populace, counterintelligence personnel are effective only when provided with properly cleared linguist support. ■ Assist employers with screening host-nation citizens (such as linguists) for Army or Department of Defense employment. ■ Assist with threat assessments and vulnerability assessments. ■ Provide analysis of the threat's human intelligence, imagery intelligence, and signals intelligence capabilities in support of intelligence collection, terrorism, and sabotage in order to develop countermeasures against them. ■ Counterintelligence technical services that may be available and of use in the urban environment include the following: ❑ Surveillance. ❑ Computer network operations; for example, assisting in protecting U.S. information and information systems while exploiting and/or attacking adversary information and information systems. ❑ Technical surveillance countermeasures (identification of technical collection activities conducted by adversary intelligence entities). ❑ Counter-signals-intelligence, which is a counterintelligence disciplinary function carried out by the signals intelligence community.
Geospatial intelligence
■ Unmanned aircraft system imagery may be one of the fastest, least risky methods of conducting reconnaissance of specific urban areas. It can update and verify current maps of those areas, showing clear routes, obstacles such as damaged and destroyed buildings, and intact and destroyed bridges. ■ Overhead imagery collection platforms are unable to see "inside" or "around" densely packed structures. Employing infrared or electro-optical systems helps, but not to the extent necessary to adequately support urban operations. ■ Cameras located with measurement and signature intelligence systems that activate when those systems are triggered provides additional "eyes" on named areas of interest. ■ Providing patrols with a digital camera or video camera can greatly assist in the debriefing and patrol reporting processes. ■ Gun camera images from aircraft that can provide a stand-off reconnaissance platform may give valuable insight into enemy tactics, techniques, and procedures. ■ Thermal sights on a vehicle patrolling an urban street late at night may note the hot engine of a vehicle on the side of the road, possibly indicating suspicious activity. ■ The Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (also called JSTARS) provides such information as the amount of vehicular traffic entering and leaving a city via multiple avenues.
Human intelligence
■ Obtain information from people and multimedia to identify elements, intentions, composition, strength, dispositions, tactics, equipment, personnel, and capabilities within and affecting the urban area. ■ Can help establish and understand the socio-cultural characteristics of the urban environment. ■ Sources can provide early warning of deep-rooted problems awaiting U.S. forces. ■ Conduct debriefings, screenings, liaison, human intelligence contact operations, interrogations, and tactical questioning; support document and media exploitation. ■ Assist the intelligence staff in deducing critical patterns and trends of persons. ■ Conduct interrogations of captured enemy personnel. ***Note***. Concentrations of humans on the battlefield do not necessarily denote a need to concentrate human intelligence assets in those locations. Threat actions outside an urban area may be a source of significant events inside the urban area. Additionally, information from sources in one city may impact operations in a distant city. Creating arbitrary intelligence boundaries based solely on geography can result in a lack of timely fusion of all critical elements of information that may be available.

Table 8-3. Considerations for intelligence operations in an urban environment (continued)

Joint and Department of Defense

- Defense Intelligence Agency produces the following products:
  - **Intelligence support packages,** which include graphics, land satellite and land satellite digital terrain evaluation data-merge imagery, maps, target line drawings, photography (when available), and multiscale electro-optical imagery.
  - Contingency support studies, which—
    - Support planning for deployed force operations and contingency planning.
    - Include text weather and climate data, oceanography and landing beaches (for amphibious operations), terrain analysis, and significant facilities with an overview map and a large-scale map of the target areas are included.
    - Include high-resolution electro-optical and land satellite imagery.
  - Contingency support packages, which—
    - Are produced in response to a specific crisis.
    - Are mission-oriented products, typically supporting a noncombatant evacuation operation. Imagery includes the embassy, the ambassador's residence, evacuation routes, assembly areas, helicopter landing zones, beaches, ports, and airfields.
  - Gridded reference graphics, which—
    - Provide an overview map, a small-scale imagery mosaic, and large-scale individual prints of a specific target area.
    - Are typically focused on urban areas but are also produced to cover large maneuver areas and lines of communications.
    - Complements National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency city graphics (1:25,000 to 1:10,000 scales) and provides excellent detail for urban mission planning.
- National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency produces a range of products that can be useful in urban environments. These products include city graphics, urban features databases, gridded installation imagery (Secret-level products), the geographic names database, terrain analysis products, imagery intelligence briefs, and annotated graphics.
- Combatant commands produce noncombatant evacuation operation intelligence support handbooks to support planning for noncombatant evacuation and hostage recovery operations.

Measurement and signature intelligence

- Measurement and signature intelligence technology can be used for both information collection and protection.
- Unattended ground sensors using measurement and signature intelligence technology can be used for—
  - Early warning (including chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear).
  - Noncontiguous area overwatch.
  - Reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition perimeter security.
  - Protection.
  - Survivability.
- Examples of how units may employ unattended ground sensors include—
  - Coverage of point and area named areas of interest, either as a single asset or in conjunction with other manned and unmanned sensors.
  - Integrated chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear smart sensors to provide the ability to detect a release from weapons of mass destruction production or storage facilities as part of post-strike battle damage assessment or a named area of interest surveillance.
  - Surveillance of mounted and dismounted assembly areas outside urban areas to facilitate condition setting for a tactical assault.
  - Area observation and information collection within urban and jungle areas for dismounted infantry operations.
  - Ground reconnaissance efforts by maintaining sensor contact and allowing Soldiers to continue performing other reconnaissance tasks.
  - Flank security for more static key assets, such as forward support bases, aviation assembly areas and forward arming and refueling points.
  - Screen missions, deception actions, and coverage of areas otherwise not observable as an economy of force role.

Table 8-3. Considerations for intelligence operations in an urban environment (continued)

Open-source intelligence
■ **Academia**. Courseware, dissertations, lectures, presentations, research papers, and studies in both hardcopy and softcopy on economics, geography (physical, cultural, and political-military), international relations, regional security, science, and technology. ■ **Governmental, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental organizations.** Databases, posted information, and printed reports on a wide variety of economic, environmental, geographic, humanitarian, security, science, and technology issues. ■ **Commercial and public information services.** Broadcasted, posted, and printed news on current international, regional, and local topics. ■ **Libraries and research centers.** Printed documents and digital databases on a range of topics, as well as knowledge and skills in information retrieval. ■ **Individuals and groups.** Handwritten, painted, posted, printed, and broadcasted information (for example, art, graffiti, leaflets, posters, and Web sites). ■ The **Internet** offers quick access to numerous types of information on urban environments, such as Intelink.
Signals intelligence
■ Buildings affect wave propagation, signal strength, and direction, thus degrading friendly communications and collection of threat signals. ■ Comprehensive electronic preparation of the battlefield must be developed during the military decisionmaking process.
Technical intelligence
■ Collect weapons components or materials for further analysis. ■ Populate databases that track different types of weapons and can link weapons to a known or suspected maker based on materials and methods used in its construction. ■ Analyze found or captured materials to determine if they are in fact weapons precursors. ■ Analyze current weapons construction and initiation methods. ■ Predict weapons trends and likely future construction and initiation methods. ■ Assess possible sources of weapons components based on forensic analysis. ■ Assist in linking captured personnel to weapons activity based on forensic evidence.

8-9. Table 8-4 on page 8-8 shows applications of the complementary intelligence capabilities. (See ADRP 2-0 for more information on the complementary intelligence capabilities.)

SUPPORT IN MOUNTAIN AND COLD WEATHER ENVIRONMENTS

8-10. A mountain environment is generally categorized as an area where altitude, relief, and weather significantly degrade normal military activities. Mountainous terrain exists in the jungle, temperate, and arctic regions of the world. (See FM 3-97.6 and ATTP 3-21.50 for doctrine on mountain operations, including considerations for information collection in a mountain environment.)

8-11. The cold weather environment is characterized by low temperatures, fog, freezing rain, snow, ice, frozen conditions, and a series of freeze-thaw cycles. These conditions can occur over 50 percent of the earth's landmass at any given time. (See ATTP 3-97.11 for doctrine on cold region operations.)

MOUNTAIN ENVIRONMENTS

8-12. Offensive and defensive tasks are the two primary military activities conducted in a mountainous environment. This discussion addresses considerations for employing information collection assets in a mountainous environment.

8-13. Operations conducted in mountainous areas are characterized by heavy use of indirect fires, canalized movements along valley floors, decentralized combat, increased reliance on aerial collection assets, and reduced communication capabilities. Mountainous terrain degrades the target acquisition and early warning capabilities of unattended ground sensors and the collection capabilities of intelligence systems. Such degradation increases the importance of emplacement and utilization of information

collection assets. Military intelligence Soldiers may have to use man-portable equipment to execute intelligence operations.

Table 8-4. Complementary intelligence capabilities

Biometrics-enabled intelligence
Biometrics as a process of confirming identity is not exclusive to the intelligence warfighting function. This enabler supports multiple activities and tasks of other warfighting functions. Intelligence-related functions that biometrics can support or enhance include— ■ Intelligence analysis (including link and pattern analysis). ■ Forensic analysis. ■ Site exploitation. ■ Base access and local security (to include screening of foreign-national and local-employee hires). ■ Force protection. ■ Interrogation and detention tasks. ■ High-value target confirmation (including high-value individuals and individuals killed in action). ■ Population control or census (screening, enrolling, and badging tasks). ■ Personnel recovery tasks. ■ Disaster relief operations. ■ Human intelligence and counterintelligence vetting of sources. ■ See TC 2-22.82 for doctrine on biometrics-enabled intelligence.
Cyber-enabled intelligence
Cyber-enabled intelligence is a complementary intelligence capability providing the ability to collect information and produce unique intelligence. Cyber-enabled intelligence is produced through the combination of intelligence analysis and the collaboration of information concerning activity in cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum. The use of cyber-enabled intelligence facilitates an understanding of the threat's— ■ Capabilities. ■ Potential actions. ■ Impact on the environment. ■ Intentions. ■ Vulnerabilities.
Document and media exploitation
Document and media exploitation is the processing, translation, analysis, and dissemination of collected hardcopy documents and electronic media that are under the U.S. Government's physical control and are not publicly available. When conducted properly, document and media exploitation tasks are intended to— ■ Maximize the value of intelligence gained from captured enemy documents and electronic storage media. ■ Provide the commander with timely and relevant intelligence to effectively enhance awareness of the threat's capabilities, operational structures, and intent. ■ Assist in criminal prosecution or legal proceedings by maintaining chain of custody procedures and preserving the evidentiary value of captured materials. ■ See TC 2-91.8 for more information on document and media exploitation.
Forensic-enabled intelligence
Forensics involves the application of a broad spectrum of scientific processes and techniques to establish facts. Battlefield or expeditionary forensics refers to the use of forensic techniques to provide timely and accurate information that facilitates situational understanding and supports decisionmaking. This includes— ■ Collecting, identifying, and labeling portable items for future exploitation. ■ Collection of fingerprints, deoxyribonucleic acid (also called DNA), and other biometric data from nontransportable items at a scene. ■ Intelligence personnel can use information from forensic analysis and send it as combat information or incorporate it in the intelligence analysis effort. Forensic-enabled intelligence— ❑ Helps accurately identify networked and complex threats and attributes them to specific incidents and activities. The effort is often critical in supporting the targeting process. ❑ Can identify and determine the source of origin of captured materials. Accurate site documentation (of incidents or events and from material and structural analysis) and supporting data and information (from various forensic processes and techniques) provide valuable data and facilitate adjusting friendly tactics and techniques and modifying equipment to enhance protection. ❑ Can help protect the force from contaminants, toxins, and other hazards through toxicology, pathology, and other forensic techniques. ❑ Supports Army medical intelligence. This intelligence includes detailed information on medical conditions of a specific area or of a threat.

8-14. The operation of ground surveillance systems in mountainous terrain is affected by interrupted line of sight, extreme temperature variations, and heavy precipitation. In mountain operations, the terrain isolation of friendly units may require battalions and companies to operate more independently than in other environments. The higher elevations are frequently shrouded by rain, snow, sleet, and fog. Electronic surveillance and visual observation are severely limited under these conditions. However, when weather permits, mountain heights offer outstanding conditions for long-range visual observation and electronic surveillance.

8-15. Intelligence staffs consider terrain trafficability and the enemy's ability to move cross-country when determining enemy capabilities and intentions. Wooded mountainous terrain has the same general effect on intelligence operations as does a dense jungle. Enemy forces are difficult to locate and collect against. As in jungle terrain, the best sources of information have proven to be enemy prisoners of war, defectors, and friendly reconnaissance patrols.

8-16. Mountainous terrain favors operations that use stealth and the cover of darkness. Forces are likely to be deployed to control passes, road junctions, built-up areas, and the high ground adjacent to these areas. Enemy tactics may include bypassing defensive positions and attacking from the flanks and rear. Mountainous terrain favors decentralized employment of artillery and using individual multiple rocket launchers as fire units.

8-17. Mountain tactics favor threat use of helicopters to drop forces behind friendly emplacements, and for reconnaissance, control, resupply, and evacuation. Threat forces can be expected to use infantry troops in the higher elevations. Mechanized units may be encountered in the lower elevations, broad valleys, depressions, and on the slopes of small hills.

8-18. In defensive positions, enemy tanks are often placed in tiers on both forward and reverse slopes, usually within platoon-sized strong points. Enemy defensive frontages can be expected to increase in mountain warfare. Enemy forces tend to select the terrain most suitable for defense and the most inaccessible to the friendly force. Mountain operations are usually directed at the control of passes. The force that controls the mountain passes controls a significant amount of terrain.

8-19. Intelligence staffs rely on maneuver Soldiers, aircraft crews, vehicle operators, and maps for terrain analysis. Mountain heights offer exceptional sites for observation posts, which may be supplemented by foot patrols. Population centers in valley areas provide a HUMINT collection and interrogation potential, especially for terrain information. Operations security, as in all operations, is of prime importance for attacking forces. Defending forces have a distinct advantage to deceive and contain any attack.

8-20. Electronic surveillance is difficult to execute in mountainous terrain. The enemy can use terrain masking, relay, and retransmission to thwart both direction finding and electronic attack activities against their communication sites. The irregular terrain, multitude of dead spaces, and degraded communication devices renders electronic surveillance less effective in the mountains than in other types of terrain. Prophet systems are best employed on high ground, concentrating on enemy approaches. Their employment can best be directed against the population centers and avenues of approach. Line-of-bearing data may be questionable due to the terrain; however, it can be used in conjunction with aerial assets for more reliable direction finding results. (See FM 2-0.)

COLD WEATHER ENVIRONMENTS

8-21. Assessing the enemy's capability to live and fight in extreme cold is an essential information requirement. At minimum, intelligence staffs consider the following factors when making this assessment. The effects of cold weather environments on personnel and equipment are numerous. Because of the effort and extra equipment necessary to keep warm, common tasks take longer and are more difficult to perform. Mobility over frozen ground can be better than over unfrozen ground. Snow or spring mud, on the other hand, can hinder or halt movement on roads or cross-country. Fog and blowing snow can reduce visibility to zero.

8-22. Staffs also consider the effects of these factors and others discussed below on friendly information collection. Extreme cold can affect the ability of Soldiers to perform collection tasks, the effectiveness of sensors and other military intelligence collection assets, and the speed at which many collection tasks can

be accomplished. In short, intelligence staffs must consider the effects of extreme cold when planning requirements and assessing collection.

Staff Considerations

8-23. Key considerations for the staff when conducting plan requirements and assess collection include but not limited to—

- Key passage points in the terrain based on the cold weather and snow effects.
- Changes to mobility corridors and avenues of approach due to ice and freezes.
- Infrared sensors are more favorable for use due to cold temperatures.
- During arctic operations, there is a great chance for electromagnetic storms (Northern lights).
- Direct and indirect fire ranges are minimized.
- Ambient temperature anomalies are good indicators of activity.

Information Collection Asset Considerations

8-24. Snow and cold weather can have detrimental effects on the operations of both mechanical and electronic equipment. The following factors can cause degradation of information collection tasks:

- Reduced mobility of vehicle-mounted systems.
- Poor or inaccurate performance of radars, sensors (including unattended ground sensors), radios, and other electro-optical systems.
- Antenna icing, which can reduce range, increase noise, alter frequency, or simply collapse antennas.
- Thickened oil and lubricants, which can cause mechanical problems in generators and vehicles.
- Decreased battery life and performance.
- Certain environmental phenomena, such as snow and fog, can significantly degrade visibility.

8-25. The successful operation of radar in cold weather is affected by—

- Signal scattering by ice, fog, and airborne snow.
- Variation of radar images caused by snow cover and frozen ground.
- Reduced ability of the equipment operators to function in the cold.
- Reduced battery life and performance.
- Cold- and condensation-induced maintenance problems.

8-26. In cold weather operations, Soldiers require longer periods of time to perform even simple tasks. Experience shows that five times the normal time may be needed. Therefore, increased time must be allowed in planning for set-up and relocation of assets. A major impact of cold weather operations on equipment is caused by cold and snow.

8-27. Extremely low temperatures cause metal parts of weapons to become brittle, resulting in a high breakage factor for internal parts. Vehicle engines and generators require frequent starting, and the frequent starts cause condensation in the internal parts of the engine, which later freezes. The intake filters of carburetors as well as communication and electronics equipment are particularly susceptible to icing.

8-28. Condensation covers on microphones and telephone handsets ice frequently if not protected. Blowing snow can also jam air intake valves. Pneumatic antenna masts and computer equipment freeze because of condensation. Power supplies have greatly reduced life spans. Long-haul communication equipment is very susceptible to malfunction in these conditions.

8-29. In cold weather operations, the human element is all-important and demands concerned leadership and thorough training. Particular attention must be given to minimizing the effects of vision whiteouts, with the attendant loss of perception, which affects driving and flying. High wind-chill factors and the potential problems of frostbite and immersion foot are additional considerations. Only with the proper training, planning, and preparation can operations be successfully conducted in a cold weather environment.

SUPPORT IN JUNGLE ENVIRONMENTS

8-30. The jungle environment includes densely forested areas, grasslands, cultivated areas, and swamps. Jungles vary from tropical rain forests and secondary growth to swamps and tropical savannas. Heavy rainfall, high and constant temperature, high humidity, and thick vegetation are the dominant features of jungle areas. These factors—climate and vegetation—contribute to the restriction of operational and sustainment capabilities of information collection assets. This discussion addresses the considerations for information collection assets in a jungle environment. (See FM 90-5 for doctrine on jungle operations.)

DECENTRALIZED MISSIONS

8-31. Because of the nature of the jungle, information collection missions are decentralized. Ground mobility restrictions of the jungle require that all information collection systems be light, man-portable, and rugged. Units operating in a jungle environment require more of these systems than units operating in other, more open, environments.

STAFF CONSIDERATIONS

8-32. Key considerations for the staff when conducting plan requirements and assess collection include but not limited to—

- Jungle operations require limited NAIs, TAIs, and engagement areas due to the lack of movement and maneuver opportunities for forces.
- Night vision capabilities are degraded due to jungle canopy blocking ambient light.
- Changes to mobility corridors and avenues of approach due to rain and monsoons.
- Infrared sensors are less favorable due to heavy vegetation, humidity, and wildlife.
- Unattended acoustic ground sensors are the best sensor, even with issues of echoing, false readings, and noise trapping.
- Heavy, dense vegetation restricts vehicular mobility but favors dispersed and dismounted infantry operations.
- Because of heavy vegetation, rate of movement times increase.
- Torrential rains and high humidity degrade performance of personnel and equipment.

INFORMATION COLLECTION ASSET CONSIDERATIONS

8-33. The following paragraphs describe the effects of jungle environments on selected information collection systems.

Unattended Ground Sensors

8-34. Heavy rain showers limit the ground sensor detection of enemy electronic signatures to short ranges. Unattended ground sensors in heavy jungle foliage are of little or no value. Signal reflections from vehicles and troops passing through or behind dense foliage tend to be inaccurate and unreadable. Although unattended ground sensor operations in jungle environments normally are limited, they are still a valuable asset to the supported commander when properly employed. Unattended ground sensors are particularly useful in preventing surprise when used with other battlefield surveillance devices.

Ground-Based Reconnaissance

8-35. Lightly equipped long-range surveillance and dismounted scouts play a major role in jungle information collection tasks. The terrain improves chances for accomplishing their mission unobserved and undetected. In patrol planning, consideration is given to the possibility that an aerial resupply, often required in jungle operations, might provide the enemy with indications of patrol activity and possibly reveal the location of the patrol. Communicating is also a problem. The intelligence value of the reconnaissance is reduced if intelligence and targeting data is not rapidly communicated.

Signals Collection

8-36. The climate, dense vegetation, and reduced radio line of sight significantly reduce the effectiveness of radio communications. These factors also make it difficult to collect against threat emitters. In the jungle, electromagnetic radiation is absorbed by a factor of 10 to 25 percent and communication ranges decrease by a factor of 20 percent. To facilitate effective communication, hilltops or aerial relays may often be used. Although using wire appears to be a logical solution, security and maintenance considerations may preclude its use.

Human Intelligence Collection

8-37. The intelligence staff may find the best sources of information to be local people. The indiginous populace can provide a wealth of information about enemy forces operating in the local area. In insurgency situations, efforts are made to identify individuals who support the enemy by providing supplies, food, and information about friendly forces in the area.

Aerial Collection

8-38. When used in conjunction with unattended ground sensors, aerial assets can present the commanders with the best picture of the battlefield. Appropriately equipped aerial assets provide the best radio line of sight to targets for line-of-bearing, intercept, and electronic attack tasks.

MAINTENANCE CONSIDERATIONS

8-39. Performing continuous preventive maintenance in accordance with the corresponding technical manuals prolongs equipment life and prevents it from becoming non-mission-capable. High incidence of rust, corrosion, and fungus caused by jungle moisture and humidity highlights the necessity for daily maintenance on equipment, especially at the operator level. This is especially true for electronic systems and communications security gear, which are subject to very high failure rates in jungle environments. Continuous operation of such systems generates heat, which combats moisture, corrosion, rust, and fungus, decreasing the mean time between failures but hastening system wear-out and increasing the consumption of fuel.

MOUNTAINOUS JUNGLE REGIONS

8-40. Mountainous regions may also be found in jungle areas. These areas are particularly difficult for patrols to traverse, especially during the rainy season. In these regions, the extremes of weather can run from very hot and humid at the lower elevations to cold and wet at the highest elevations.

SUPPORT IN DESERT ENVIRONMENTS

8-41. Deserts are semiarid regions of varying relief containing a wide variety of soils. There are three types of desert: mountain, rocky plateau, and sandy or dune. Desert temperatures vary according to latitude and season, from over 136 degrees Fahrenheit in the deserts of Mexico and Libya to the bitter cold of winter in the Gobi (East Asia). In some deserts, day-to-night temperature fluctuation exceeds 70 degrees Fahrenheit. (See FM 90-3 for doctrine on desert operations.) This discussion addresses the considerations for information collection assets in a desert environment.

OVERVIEW

8-42. Collection assets are focused on targets at significantly greater distances than normal in the desert. The characteristics of desert terrain require more tracked and fewer wheeled vehicles for electronic surveillance systems. Frequent and extreme changes in desert weather have a significant influence on information collection capabilities. Long periods of unlimited visibility can be abruptly interrupted by violent winds and sandstorms. These storms reduce visibility and drive sand into mechanical and electronic equipment, causing frequent breakdowns. Wear and tear, particularly on mechanical equipment, requires frequent replacement of moving parts. Increased requirements for spare parts place an additional burden on the supply system, increasing the vulnerability of friendly logistic operations.

TEMPERATURE

8-43. Wide variations in day and night temperatures also have detrimental effects on people and machines. Precautions must be taken to prevent casualties resulting from high temperatures and direct exposure to the sun. High desert temperatures may cause equipment to overheat. Heat causes batteries to lose power more quickly. High temperatures cause overheating in communication equipment, resulting in equipment failure. Communication equipment must be protected from heat and from the direct rays of the sun.

8-44. Degradation of line-of-sight radio communication occurs due to extreme heat. Communication during hours of darkness are excellent. However, during daylight, a 20-to-30 percent loss of radio communication is experienced, due to heat. Frequency drift can also limit radio capabilities. Electronic surveillance equipment suffers frequent down time from sand and dust if not protected. Imagery systems are subject to heat wave distortion and dust storms. HUMINT operations are reduced, due to smaller population areas.

8-45. Vehicle maintenance requirements increase in extreme heat. The heat dries out seals and gaskets and causes tires to crack. The effects of sand on equipment create the need to constantly replace bearings and other moving parts. Since reconnaissance in desert operations is generally accomplished using mounted patrols, maintenance requirements directly impact on reconnaissance capabilities.

8-46. Humidity and temperature variations cause condensation and rust. Condensation degrades the effectiveness of the optical devices by causing mold to form on lenses, requiring extra precautions to be taken. Equipment must be cleaned on a daily basis.

STAFF CONSIDERATIONS

8-47. Key considerations for the staff when conducting plan requirements and assess collection include but not limited to—

- Desert operations favor mechanized and armored forces.
- Mobile nature of dessert operations necessitates the use of radios to maintain adequate mission command and networks.
- Surveillance ranges are extended in both depth and width, allowing for maximum range engagement.
- Opportunities for high rates of advance can cause maneuver forces to outrun their intelligence operations assets. This causes more reliance on aerial information collection assets.
- Ground and aerial operations are extremely limited during dust- and sand storms.
- Infrared sensors are favorable for use but are hampered during thermal crossover.
- Severe temperature variations require personnel to be equipped for both hot and cold weather.
- Direct and indirect fire ranges are extended.

INFORMATION COLLECTION ASSET CONSIDERATIONS

8-48. The following paragraphs describe the effects of desert environments on selected information collection systems.

Visual and Electronic Observation

8-49. The problems associated with desert observations and reconnaissance include—

- Long ranges and the refraction of visible light impairing visual perception.
- Heat waves blurring detail.
- The actual location of observed objects becoming difficult to determine.
- Mirages distorting objects to the point of being unrecognizable.

8-50. The intensity of these effects often depends on the angle of the sun in relationship to the observer. Observation in the desert is enhanced by placing observers as high above the desert floor as possible.

8-51. The optimum operation of radar in desert terrain is degraded by—

- Dust and sand.
- Temperature variations.
- Static electricity.
- Wind.

8-52. To obtain the best performance in target detection, place the radar set as high as possible above the area under surveillance, so that the radar antenna overlooks the area. On smooth, sandy surfaces, the detection range for moving targets may be reduced, because sand presents a surface that does not reflect an appreciable amount of clutter. Increasing the operating angle helps to reduce this deficiency. A second disadvantage caused by the terrain is that little natural cover and concealment is available for radar positions.

Unattended Ground Sensors

8-53. Unattended ground sensors can be used to overcome visual distortion caused by the magnification by heat waves. They can also be used to acquire targets at extended ranges and cover considerable distances across the front and flanks.

Aerial Collection Platforms

8-54. It is extremely difficult to conceal combat forces and operations in the flat, open terrain common to many deserts. Airborne collection platforms are very effective in locating concentrated enemy forces. Air reconnaissance is used to the maximum extent possible.

Ground-Based Reconnaissance

8-55. Observation posts in static situations are sited in pairs as far apart as possible to permit accurate intersection. Desert terrain favors wide envelopments and turning movements. The information collection effort must cover all directions and use all available collection systems, especially those with long-range capabilities.

8-56. Foot patrols are generally limited to static defensive operations, while mobile patrols are effective in offensive operations. When a unit is on a march, security elements will normally be located at least 2,000 to 4,000 meters to the front and flank of the lead elements, depending on the terrain.

Signals Intelligence

8-57. Operations security responsibilities increase significantly due to the long range of enemy imagery and SIGINT systems in the desert. Like operations security, the value of electronic warfare has increased importance in the desert. The expansiveness of the desert precludes using terrain masking to avoid jamming. Electronic attack can play a significant role in air defense and close air support suppression.

MILITARY DECEPTION

8-58. Since large unit consolidations and preparations for attack are virtually impossible to hide, commanders on both sides may decide to conceal the time and place of attack through the use of deception operations. The intelligence staff must be prepared to provide intelligence support to the operations staff for deception planning. The intelligence staff incorporates all available collection means to achieve as much redundancy as possible. All efforts are made to confirm or deny significant indications of enemy intentions. (See JP 3-13.4 for doctrine on military deception.)

Appendix A
Joint, National, and Multinational Planning

JOINT INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

A-1. Joint intelligence supports joint operations by providing critical information and finished intelligence products to the combatant command, subordinate Service and functional component commands, and subordinate joint forces. Commanders at all levels depend on timely, accurate information and intelligence on a number of an adversary's dispositions: among them, strategy, tactics, intent, objectives, strengths, weaknesses, values, capabilities, and critical vulnerabilities. Joint intelligence must focus on the commander's mission and concept of operations.

A-2. An understanding of joint ISR is required to understand the relationship of Army intelligence operations and information collection to joint ISR. (See FM 2-0.) Many joint ISR collection assets that formerly supported joint force and higher echelons now support Army forces at BCT, or even battalion, level. Thus, all Army staffs must understand specific planning considerations for joint, national, and multinational assets.

A-3. One example of joint ISR support now available to Army forces is the Navy's P-3 Orion aircraft. This system, originally designed for antisubmarine and anti-surface-warfare maritime patrol operations, is now used to provide full-motion video and SIGINT support to commanders of deployed forces. P-3s are also used by the Department of Homeland Security for countersmuggling and counterdrug operations. Another example is the Air Force's UAS systems, such as the Predator and Reaper. These were in the purview of commanders at echelons above corps, but are now available to tactical-level Army commanders. Air Force ISR liaison officers are assigned at corps and division headquarters and planned for availability at BCTs in the near future.

JOINT INTELLIGENCE PROCESS

A-4. Joint doctrine defines intelligence operations differently from Army doctrine. Joint doctrine defines *intelligence operations* as the variety of intelligence and counterintelligence tasks that are carried out by various intelligence organizations and activities within the intelligence process (JP 2-0). The joint intelligence process describes how the various types of joint intelligence operations interact to meet the commander's intelligence needs. The process includes the following intelligence operations:

- Planning and direction.
- Collection.
- Processing and exploitation.
- Analysis and production.
- Dissemination and integration.
- Evaluation and feedback.

JOINT TERMINOLOGY

A-5. Service-specific and joint terms describing management of information collection may differ, based on the respective Service. In joint intelligence doctrine, *collection management* is the process of converting intelligence requirements into collection requirements, establishing priorities, tasking or coordinating with appropriate collection sources or agencies, monitoring results, and retasking as required (JP 2-0). In the joint lexicon, collection management has two distinct functions: collection requirements management and collection operations management. (See figure A-1 on page A-2.)



Figure A-1. Joint collection management

A-6. Collection requirements management—

- Defines what intelligence systems must collect.
- Focuses on the requirements of the customer.
- Is all-source- (all-intelligence-discipline-) oriented and advocates (provides and supports) what information is necessary for collection.

A-7. Collection operations management—

- Specifies how to satisfy the requirement.
- Focuses on the selection of specific intelligence disciplines and specific systems within a discipline to collect information addressing customers' requirements.
- Is conducted by organizations to determine which collection assets can best satisfy customers' product requests.

A-8. Collection requirements management and collection operations management are performed at all joint levels. Each level interacts with levels above and below, as well as among units, agencies, and organizations on the same level. The further up the chain of command, the broader the perspective and scope of responsibility; the lower the chain of command, the more specific the function and narrower the scope. Organizations possessing collection assets or resources perform collection operations management.

A-9. Tasking, processing, exploitation, and dissemination (also called TPED) is the joint expression used to describe associated activities that support a joint task force commander's collection strategy and subsequent ISR operations. Similarly, Army intelligence officers consider the analysis, production, and dissemination effort as part of planning requirements and assessing collection. Much of tasking, processing, exploitation, and dissemination occurs outside the theater of operations via reachback (what the Army calls intelligence reach) and is distributed through the intelligence architecture so requirements do not overwhelm in-theater assets. Service organizations and joint organizations provide reachback capabilities to forward-deployed joint forces. Service organizations include the National Ground Intelligence Center, National Maritime Intelligence Center, Marine Corps Intelligence Agency, and the Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Agency (which includes the National Air and Space Intelligence Center). Joint organizations include the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Center for Medical Intelligence.

A-10. Two other important joint terms are collection asset and collection resource. A *collection asset* is a collection system, platform, or capability that is supporting, assigned, or attached to a particular commander (JP 2-01). A *collection resource* is a collection system, platform, or capability that is not assigned or attached to a specific unit or echelon which must be requested and coordinated through the chain of command (JP 2-01). A collection asset is subordinate to the requesting unit or echelon, while a collection resource is not. (See JP 2-01.3.)

A-11. In joint collection management, all requests for support (collection) are referred to as *target nominations*. From the joint collection resource perspective, an NAI or TAI is a target for collection. Target nomination boards are responsible for prioritizing collection requests and allocating resources against those requirements.

JOINT INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS

A-12. When Army forces operate under a joint headquarters, several organizations in the joint intelligence architecture can assist intelligence officers at lower echelons in their planning. The key organizations in the defense intelligence architecture are as follows (see JP 2-0 for a discussion of each):

- Intelligence directorates (also called J-2s) at every joint level of command.
- Joint intelligence operations centers (also called JIOCs) at combatant command level.
- The following elements at joint task force level:
  - Joint intelligence support element (also called the JISE).
  - Joint functional component command–intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (also called the JFCC-ISR).
  - Joint reserve intelligence center (also called the JRIC).

A-13. At the joint task force level, a joint intelligence support element is normally established. However a joint intelligence operations center may be established, based on the scope, duration, and mission of the unit or joint task force.

A-14. For example, a joint intelligence operations center created in a typical joint task force intelligence directorate may include collection management operations and request for information branches. These elements plan information collection activities and are therefore useful to Army intelligence officers. In some cases, the collection management and dissemination sections are combined into one section.

A-15. The joint force collection manager ensures all requests for additional collection resources are based on validated needs established by the command's formal intelligence requirements.

A-16. Subordinate Army commanders submit their requests for information through echelon channels. If they cannot be answered at the intermediate echelons, they are passed to the joint task force for research and response. Once a request for information is returned unanswered, subordinate commanders can submit a request for support (collection) or request for joint support to the joint intelligence operations center, which apportions its assets or resources from higher echelons against the requests in order of priority, as defined by the joint force commander. Collection requirements that cannot be satisfied by assets controlled or apportioned by the joint task force are transferred into the national intelligence system for collection.

A-17. The joint intelligence support element is created at the discretion of the joint force commander to augment the intelligence directorate of a joint task force. For Army planners, the collection management operations branch is the interface where subordinate Army commanders receive support from the joint task force. The collection management operations branch is responsible for joint task force ISR operations. Dynamic retasking of joint resources must be coordinated with the joint intelligence support element collection management operations branch.

JOINT COLLECTION MANAGEMENT PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

A-18. In joint collection management operations, the collection manager, in coordination with the operations directorate, forwards collection requirements to the Service component commander exercising tactical control over joint force ISR assets. A mission tasking order is issued to the unit selected as responsible for the collection operation. The selected unit, sometimes called the mission manager, makes the final choice of specific platforms, equipment, and personnel required for the collection operation, based on operational considerations, such as, maintenance, schedules, training, and experience.

COLLECTION MANAGEMENT MISSION APPLICATIONS

A-19. Collection Management Mission Applications is a Web-centric information system architecture that incorporates existing programs and is sponsored by several commands, Services, and agencies. It provides

tools for recording, gathering, organizing, and tracking intelligence collection requirements for all intelligence disciplines. It facilitates the rapid and secure exchange of collection management data and applications and provides continuous mission support to consumers of collection management information worldwide.

A-20. The Collection Management Mission Applications is used by the Air Force and comprises the following subsystems:

- **Battlespace Visualization Initiative** is a three-dimensional graphical visualization system used to plan imagery intelligence, SIGINT, and measurement and signature intelligence collection by national technical means.
- **Web Battlespace Visualization Initiative** is the two-dimensional version of Battlespace Visualization Initiative for lower end workstations.
- **Flight Control®** is a commercial tool providing a geospatial interface used to develop situational awareness in near real time.
- **Planning Tool for Resource Integration, Synchronization, and Management** (also called PRISM) is a collection requirement, management, and collaboration tool.
- **Joint Collaborative Environment** uses a commercial software application called Info Workspace, allowing users to collaborate online in conferences and in one-on-one chats. Joint Collaborative Environment provides far-flung users with the ability to collaborate on conflicts and synchronize the collection effort.
- **Multi Asset Synchronizer** provides critical planning and execution tools to the air and space operations center.
- **Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Gateway** uses compartmented mode workstation applications along with data feeds from assets within the theater of operations to provide situational understanding for critical planning, management, tasking, and reporting.

NATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

A-21. Army intelligence Soldiers need to be familiar with the organizations in the intelligence community and the support they can provide to Army commanders. (See ADRP 2-0 for a description of the intelligence community and joint considerations.)

A-22. National collection resources are leveraged against national priorities. Intelligence Soldiers must remember that these assets are scarce and have a multitude of high-priority requirements.

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TEAMS

A-23. National intelligence support teams are formed at the request of a deployed joint task force commander. These teams comprise intelligence and communication experts from the Defense Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, and other agencies, as required to support the joint force commander's specific needs. The Joint Staff intelligence directorate is the executive agent for the national intelligence support team program and has delegated this mission to the Deputy Directorate for Crisis Operations (also called the J-2O). This office manages daily operations and interagency coordination for all teams. The Defense Intelligence Agency is the executive agent for all national intelligence support team operations. Once on station, a team supplies a steady stream of agency intelligence on local conditions and potential threats. Mission needs dictate the team's size and composition.

A-24. National intelligence support team personnel are often sent to support corps- or division-level organizations. However, during recent operations, national agencies placed personnel at the BCT level.

NATIONAL PLANNING RESOURCES

A-25. The following national databases and Intelink sites contain information applicable to the IPB process and planning. They should be reviewed and evaluated to determine the availability of current data, information, and intelligence products that might answer intelligence or information requirements:

- **Modernized Integrated Data Base.** Accessible via Intelink, this database contains current, worldwide and theater threat characteristics (previously order of battle factors). This data is organized by country, unit, facility, and equipment.
- **National Exploitation System.** Managed by the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and accessible via Intelink, this resource permits users to—
  - Research the availability of imagery coverage over targets of interest.
  - Access historical national imagery archives and imagery intelligence reports.
- **Country knowledge bases and crisis home pages.** Many combatant commands and joint force commands have Intelink Web sites containing the best and most up-to-date intelligence products available from the intelligence community.
- **SIGINT On-line Information System.** This resource is a database containing current and historical finished SIGINT products.
- **Secure Analyst File Environment.** This resource comprises structured data files. The following databases are accessible:
  - **Intelligence Report Index Summary File.** This resource contains index records and the full text of current and historical intelligence information reports.
  - **All-Source Document Index.** This resource contains index records and abstracts for hardcopy all-source intelligence documents produced by the Defense Intelligence Agency.
- **HUMINT collection requirements.** This is a registry of all validated HUMINT requirements and tasking.
- **Modernized Defense Intelligence Threat Data System.** This resource is a collection of analytical tools that support the retrieval and analysis of information and intelligence related to counterintelligence, indications and warning, and counterterrorism.
- **Community On-Line Intelligence System for End-users and Managers.** This database application (also called COLISEUM), allows users to identify and track the status of all validated crisis and noncrisis intelligence production requirements.

GEOSPATIAL INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SERVICES

A-26. The Geospatial Intelligence Information Management Services brings together various tools and systems to centralize the management, tasking, and collection of geospatial intelligence data for government and commercial sources. It also incorporates elements of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency Production Management Alternative Architecture, which provides an integrated geospatial requirements and production management system. The Geospatial Intelligence Information Management Services—

- Includes commercial ordering capabilities formerly associated with the Production Management Alternative Architecture.
- Incorporates the geospatial data tasking portions of the Production Management Alternative Architecture.
- Supports collection managers and analysts who want to submit geospatial intelligence needs.
- Is Web-based and available via the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (also called JWICS).
- Allows novice- and expert-level research, discovery, and simple and advanced searches.
- Allows users to capture, store, and manage geospatial knowledge and geospatial objects.
- Is the single entry point for tasking of national technical means and commercial assets and supports one-stop shopping for tasking, production, and dissemination of geospatial intelligence products.
- Allows viewing of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency production process.

NATIONAL SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS PROCESS

A-27. The National SIGINT Requirements Process is an integrated and responsive system of policies, procedures, and technology used by the intelligence community to manage requests for national-level SIGINT products and services. This process replaced the National SIGINT Requirements System.

A-28. The National SIGINT Requirements Process establishes an end-to-end cryptologic mission management tracking system based on information needs. This process establishes guidance SIGINT collectors follow to satisfy tactical- through national-level consumer information needs. The process improves the consumer's ability to communicate with the collector by adding focus and creating a mechanism for accountability and feedback:

- **Information needs** are used to relay collection requirements to SIGINT collectors and systems. Information needs are prioritized and classified according to standardized time categories. They are further prioritized based on how quickly the SIGINT community must react to the request for support (collection):
  - ***Routine*** requests require action in 30 or more days.
  - ***Time-sensitive*** requests require action within 4 to 29 days of submission.
  - ***Time-critical*** requests must be acted upon within 3 days of submission.
- **Research information needs** priorities involve limited efforts and only exist for a defined period of time using existing data (no new collection is required).
- **Limited duration needs** require collection and production over a period of 0 to 90 days.
- **Standing needs** require sustained collection over periods from 91 days to two years.

A-29. Requests for national SIGINT collection must be sponsored at the national level, validated by the intelligence community, and prioritized among all other competing requirements.

MULTINATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

A-30. There is no single intelligence doctrine for multinational operations. Each coalition or alliance must develop its own procedures. (See FM 3-16.)

A-31. In multinational operations, the multinational force commander exercises command authority over a military force comprising elements from two or more nations. Therefore, in most multinational operations, the joint task force must share intelligence with foreign military forces as necessary for mission accomplishment and coordinate the exchange of intelligence liaison with those forces.

A-32. Command of national resources may remain essentially national or may be integrated into a single command and control structure for the force. Either way, intelligence remains a national responsibility, and most nations with a significant presence in the multinational force establish a national intelligence cell.

A-33. U.S. units subordinated to non-U.S. headquarters may require augmentation with linguists or bilingual liaison officers. These units may also require connectivity to U.S. networks. Connectivity to U.S. networks is critical to success in a multinational environment.

ALLIANCES

A-34. Army units frequently perform intelligence operations in a multinational environment within the structure of an alliance, which presents many additional challenges for intelligence personnel. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (also called NATO) and the United Nations Command in the Republic of Korea are examples of highly structured and enduring alliances. Intelligence architectures, organizations, and procedures are well defined in alliances. Therefore, Army staffs must learn to operate within the parameters of an alliance, maintaining SOPs and standards in accordance with their unit policies but also complying with the alliance's standardized agreements.

A-35. An alliance's existing international standardization agreements (for example, NATO standardization agreements [also called STANAGs]) establish rules and policies for conducting joint intelligence operations. Since each multinational operation has unique aspects, such standing agreements may have to

be modified or amended based on the situation. However, these agreements provide a starting point for establishing policies for a specific operation.

COALITIONS

A-36. Other multinational military organizations, such as the coalition formed during the 1991 Gulf War, are temporary or ad hoc organizations formed for a particular mission. Coalitions require a great deal more adaptation and improvisation to achieve success. Often, the coalition comes together on short notice, and the arrangements for collaboration and intelligence sharing must be established while planning is underway.

A-37. Sometimes a U.S. force might require authority to go outside the usual military channels to provide information to nongovernmental organizations or other governments and agencies to achieve the commander's intent. In those cases, the force must tailor its intelligence policies and dissemination guidance.

INTELLIGENCE COLLABORATION

A-38. Multinational force operations can be complicated by language issues, differing tasking and request channels and formats, information classification and foreign disclosure concerns, and national sensitivities. Troop-contributing nations may have political or rules of engagement constraints that limit their ability to perform certain missions.

A-39. Collection managers must be familiar with multinational collection and communication systems and the tasking and request channels they require. Using intelligence liaison personnel has proven effective in formulating an effective collection strategy and facilitating rapid dissemination of information and intelligence.

A-40. The exact steps taken to effect intelligence collaboration between U.S and multinational forces depend on the command structure of the multinational force and the nature of the operation. The following guidelines for a U.S. intelligence staff have proven effective in facilitating this collaboration:

- Establish liaison between the U.S. and multinational force intelligence organizations.
- Develop procedures for review to expedite sanitization and sharing of U.S.-generated intelligence products with multinational partners.
- Communicate friendly objectives, intentions, and plans to appropriate intelligence organizations.
- Ensure interoperability of mission command information and communication systems. This is achieved by placing a common multinational intelligence information system, such as the Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (also called CENTRIXS), in the force headquarters and subordinate units to facilitate communication.

Similarities and Differences

A-41. There are differences in intelligence doctrine and procedures among multinational partners. A key to effective multinational intelligence is extensive coordination, training, and liaison, beginning with the highest levels of command, to make the adjustments required to resolve these differences:

- Major differences may include—
  - How intelligence is provided to the commander (jointly or by individual Services or agencies).
  - Procedures for sharing information among intelligence agencies.
  - The degree of security afforded by different communication systems and procedures.
- Administrative differences that need to be addressed may include—
  - Classification levels.
  - Personnel security clearance standards.
  - Requirements for access to sensitive intelligence.
  - Translation requirements.

A-42. Typically, there is a disparity in the capabilities of U.S. and multinational forces:

- Multinational forces may have—
  - Greater intelligence resources within a given region.
  - Valuable and extensive HUMINT capabilities.
  - Access to the population and open sources.
- U.S. forces generally have to provide technical assistance to share information and intelligence.

Foreign Disclosure Considerations

A-43. It is imperative that multinational force commanders establish a system that optimizes each nation's contributions and strengths. All units under the multinational headquarters are entitled to reliable intelligence. U.S. units subordinated to non-U.S. headquarters may face unique problems in disseminating intelligence. If a direct channel is available to the next higher U.S. headquarters, the tactical U.S. unit may have better and more current intelligence than its controlling non-U.S. headquarters. In that instance, liaison personnel have a responsibility to disseminate intelligence both up and down, while adhering to restrictions that deal with the release of intelligence to multinational forces.

A-44. In multinational operations, there are constraints to foreign disclosure due to the technical nature of the data, imagery, or intelligence product disseminated. Practices, such as "write for release," become very important in facilitating intelligence sharing. Whenever possible, tear-line reports and releasable imagery should be obtained to share with multinational partners.

SYSTEMS COMPATIBILITY

A-45. A multinational force may have multiple national communication systems that do not communicate with each other. Each nation in a multinational force brings its own internal systems; however, in most cases involving U.S. forces, multinational partners are likely to rely on the United States to provide a common communication system. The importance of placing U.S. liaison officers at multinational partner headquarters cannot be understated because of system compatibility issues that frequently arise.

Appendix B
Aerial Collection Requests

COORDINATING COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

B-1. Comprehensive coordination between the intelligence and operations staffs ensures forecasting and resourcing of critical collection requirements. Despite deliberate planning for aerial support, more immediate and critical requirements emerge and evolve continually. Retasking assets quickly is an important aspect of exploiting opportunities presented, consistent with the joint force commander's intent and standing priorities.

B-2. In joint collection management operations, the collection manager, in coordination with the operations directorate of the joint force staff, forwards collection requirements to the Service component commander exercising tactical control over the joint force reconnaissance and surveillance assets. A mission tasking order goes to the unit selected to be responsible for the collection operation. The selected unit, sometimes called the mission manager, makes the final choice of specific platforms, equipment, and personnel required for the collection operations based on operational considerations such as maintenance, schedules, training, and experience.

B-3. Any information collection plan involving aerial assets must consider airspace coordination. (For additional information on Army airspace coordination, see FM 3-52.)

AIR AND SPACE OPERATIONS CENTER

B-4. Joint air planning products produced by the air and space operations center include the—

- Air tasking order (ATO).
- Airspace control order.
- Special instructions (also called SPINS).

B-5. The ATO, airspace control order, and special instructions provide operational and tactical direction at the appropriate levels of detail. For aerial assets, these products are important for intelligence staffs as well as mission managers and operators (for example, UAS operators and aircraft pilots).

B-6. Army intelligence staffs coordinate with the air and space operations center through an Army unit called a battlefield coordination detachment. This detachment is the Army Service component command's liaison at the air and space operations center. It communicates the land component commander's issues to the air component commander. Aerial collection requests flow through the battlefield coordination detachment to the air and space operations center for consideration. (See ATTP 3-09.13.)

B-7. The joint force air component commander may establish one or more joint air component coordination elements with other headquarters to better integrate joint air operations with their operations. When established, this coordination element is a Service component-level liaison that serves as the direct representative of the air component commander.

B-8. To maximize combat effectiveness, minimize the risk of fratricide, and assure deconfliction, all Service component forces must adhere to the joint force commander's guidance. This guidance is provided in the rules of engagement, airspace control plan, airspace control order, area air defense plan, and the special instructions (contained in the ATO).

AIR TASKING ORDER

B-9. An *air tasking order* is a method used to task and disseminate to components, subordinate units, and command and control agencies projected sorties, capabilities and/or forces to targets and specific missions. (JP 3-30). The ATO normally provides specific instructions such as call signs, targets, and controlling

agencies, as well as general instructions. The ATO articulates the tasking for joint air operations for a specific time frame, normally 24 hours. The full air tasking cycle, from joint force commander guidance to the start of ATO execution depends on the joint force and air component commanders' procedures; however, a 72-hour cycle is fairly standard. Some smaller (group 1) UASs may not be included in the ATO based on use and mission requirements. The inclusion of air assets in the ATO does not imply any change in command relationships or tasking authority over them, nor does it restrict Service component commanders' flexibility to respond to the dynamics of the operational environment. (See JP 3-30.)

AIRSPACE CONTROL ORDER

B-10. The *airspace control order* is an order implementing the airspace control plan that provides the details of the approved requests for airspace coordinating measures. It is published either as part of the air tasking order or as a separate document (JP 3-52). The airspace control order provides directions to deconflict airspace and air defense plans in order to avoid mutual interference (such as collisions and near-miss situations), facilitate air defense identification, safely accommodate and expedite airflow, and prevent fratricide.

B-11. The airspace control order describes positive and procedural control measures to be used in the joint operations area and designates airspace coordinating measures, altitude restrictions, and identification procedures. For example, UAS operations require the designation of restricted operating zones to prohibit manned aircraft from conflicting with unmanned aircraft.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

B-12. *Special instructions* are instructions issued to aviators that describe detailed procedures for loss of communication, escape and evasion, and search and rescue operations. (See JP 3-30.) Special instructions are normally published in an annex to the ATO. The Special Instructions annex of the ATO implements the area air defense plan.

B-13. It is important for intelligence staffs to be aware of special instructions so they can react to a downed aircraft or isolated Soldier incident. Special instructions can be used to anticipate the actions of Soldiers on the ground when immediate collection requirements arise. In addition, special instructions (and the rules of engagement) contain the priorities and procedures for dynamic retasking of joint ISR assets, including UASs.

AIR TASKING ORDER PLANNING CYCLES

B-14. The ATO planning cycle typically consists of three 24-hour periods:

- The 24-hour period currently in execution.
- The 24-hour period when the next order is in development, production, and dissemination.
- The 24-hour period when the order after next is in planning.

B-15. Submission of air mission requests or UAS mission inputs are usually required before the air tasking cycle begins. Army units having problems with an ATO or requiring an emergency change to the ATO should coordinate through the battlefield coordination detachment. Precise time frames for ATO planning and submission of air mission requests are specified in the air and space operations center SOPs or operation plan.

B-16. Intelligence staffs may use different planning horizons for ground-based assets; however, planning for aerial assets must be tied to the air tasking cycle and planned in advance for loading into the ATO to support the commander's needs.

B-17. The ATO tasks and disseminates to Service components, subordinate units, and command and control agencies the projected sorties, capabilities, and forces to targets and specific missions. This process normally provides specific instructions, such as, call signs, targets, controlling agencies, and general instructions. To intelligence staffs at the various maneuver echelons, the ATO outlines the daily schedule of aerial reconnaissance missions.

B-18. From command guidance, target work sheets, and Service component requirements, the appropriate staff finalizes the ATO, special instructions, and airspace control order. The ATO describes the actions

while the special instructions and airspace control order impose constraints. An airspace control order, for example, might specify that air defense assets in a given area assume any aircraft below 10,000 feet is hostile (air defense plans). The special instructions might include political considerations that require certain areas not to be overflown (airspace control).

B-19. Considerations for a typical 72-hour aerial collection cycle are based on the ATO and the associated timelines at the various echelons. Table B-1 describes the tasks associated with a 72-hour air tasking cycle.

B-20. A *target deck* is a list of locations along the flight routes or objective area where the unit wants the aircraft to collect information. It may also be a list of SIGINT targets on which the unit wants to collect information. Approved target decks are posted to unit Web pages. Aerial collection units and the supported units establish real-time communications, sometimes down to Soldier level, to work the bottom-up refinement and dynamic retasking. That process is critical to ensure the collection assets collect information focused on the supported commander's current priorities, not on a template produced at corps or division.

Table B-1. Division-level tasks associated with an aerial collection cycle timeline

Up to 72 hours before collection mission start
• Brigade combat teams develop their collection requirements and build their target decks, forwarding them to division for refinement and inclusion in the division's requests for support (collection). • The primary deconfliction function during this time frame is verifying requests against stated information collection priorities. • Information collection priorities are normally published in the unit order or plan and drive the overall information collection effort. • The initial plan is presented to the G-3 and forwarded to corps to begin parallel planning. • The proposed schedule is posted to the division home page.
48 to 72 hours before collection mission start
• Any issues concerning the proposed aerial asset schedule and changes in the collection priorities are solved. • A proposed information collection plan is presented to the G-3 for approval, as well as distributed to brigade combat teams and other subordinate commands.
24 to 48 hours before collection mission start
• The G-3 approves the proposed information collection plan and sends it to corps for action. • Requests for changes in the approved schedule, including immediate requests or priority changes, are presented to the G-3 for resolution. • Once all changes based on the tactical situation are made, the staff begins the mission planning cycle. • Requirements at corps are validated, and aerial assets are tasked to conduct reconnaissance and surveillance missions. • Simultaneously, the air and space operations center coordinates airspace and creates the air tasking order. • At the aerial unit, command groups receive the tasking and initiate the mission planning process. • At the aerial unit, the staff develops the schedule and coordinates mission and flight operations. • Additionally, mission operations sections collaborate with the corps, divisions, or brigade combat teams to ensure target decks are logical and the correct aerial asset is placed against the collection requirement.
6 to 12 hours before collection mission start
• The approved plan is refined as dictated by the tactical situation, with G-3 approval. • Intelligence staffs, along with aerial mission planners, make final adjustments to collection asset target decks.

REQUESTING AERIAL COLLECTION

B-21. There are three types of collection requests: preplanned, immediate, and dynamic.

PREPLANNED REQUESTS

B-22. Preplanned collection requirements are those required for the requesting unit to plan, prepare, execute, and assess future operations. They may also be existing standing requirements for indications and warning or protection of the force. The air and space operations center and battlefield coordination detachment monitor and analyze threat activity and support targeting while providing feedback to the commander to aid decisionmaking for shaping operations. Preplanned collection enables the seamless transition from preplanned missions to dynamic tasking and cueing of assets. Preplanned requirements typically focus on—

- **Indications and warning**—identifying key events and tippers to activity.
- **Support to targeting**—assisting the fires cell in the targeting process.
  - ***Target identification***—assisting in identifying high-value targets and high-payoff targets.
  - ***Target verification***—assisting in establishing the identification and status of a target.
  - ***Combat assessment***—providing intelligence to support the combat assessment process.
- **Situational awareness**—providing knowledge and understanding of the current situation, which promotes timely, relevant, and accurate assessment of operations to facilitate decisionmaking.
- **Protection**—providing information collection and joint aerial assets to protect friendly forces.
- **Personnel recovery**—assisting in recovering missing personnel.
- **National requirements**—fulfilling national requirements taskings.
- **Common operational picture**—providing information for the common operational picture.

B-23. Figure B-1 shows the information submitted with a typical request for aerial collection.

All requests require the following information:

- Unit tracking number.
- Requesting unit.
- Requesting unit point of contact.
- Unit point of contact information (phone and email).
- Internet relay chat (also called mIRC) rooms (primary and alternate).
- Date and time of request.
- Required effect (for example, full-motion video, electro-optical, radar, signals intelligence).
- Unit tracking number.
- Supported event or operation.
- Request justification.
- Classification of products.
- Dissemination of results.

Provide the following additional information for the target. If the request involves multiple targets, provide the following information for each target:

- Priority.
- Target name.
- Target description.
- Target location (in latitude and longitude and military grid reference system coordinates).
- Basic encyclopedia (also called BE) number.
- Earliest time information is of value.
- Latest time information is of value.
- Essential elements of information. (Enter groups and indicators. See paragraphs 3-27 through 3-30.)
- Reporting instructions.
- Special instructions.
- Remarks.

Figure B-1. Required information for a request for aerial support

B-24. The collection request approval process varies. A typical approval process is shown in figure B-2. This process shows how a request to the BCT (or any subordinate unit) is processed at the division or corps level and eventually becomes a tasking for an aerial collection asset.

B-25. The originating unit makes the first decision: whether organic collection assets have the capability to answer the information requirement. If the requesting unit does not have the organic capability to collect against and process information needed to answer the information requirement, the unit may submit a request for aerial collection. Requests for support (collection) require additional information, some of which may not be in the unit's information collection plan. These requests become preplanned, immediate, or dynamic requests for support (collection).



Figure B-2. Aerial collection request process

IMMEDIATE REQUESTS

B-26. An immediate collection request is a collection requirement submitted outside the normal ISR operations planning cycle after the ATO and daily joint ISR plan are published. It attempts to integrate joint aerial collection into a time-sensitive operation. Proper coordination through the chain of command is vital throughout the collection management process, including immediate collection requests. Subordinate units must coordinate their immediate collection requests with their higher headquarters collection managers. This makes the immediate collection process quicker and ensures proper prioritization of immediate collection requests with existing requirements already tasked for collection during the ATO cycle.

DYNAMIC REQUESTS

B-27. Aerial dynamic retasking is any change to the ATO during execution. Only the air and space operations center can effect dynamic retasking of airborne aerial assets. Situations that may warrant dynamic retasking of an aerial asset include—

- Dynamic targeting.
- Troops in contact.
- Time-critical physical and functional assessment.
- Weather and maintenance issues.
- Ad hoc or emergent collection.
- Personnel recovery or downed aircraft.
- Compressed or extended collection timelines and/or processing.
- Exploitation.
- Dissemination system failures.

B-28. The most notable difference between immediate requests and dynamic retasking is aircraft launch status. Typically, immediate requests are those made inside the normal planning cycle and generate a new mission. Dynamic retaskings are those requests that divert existing missions to new priorities. Dynamic retasking requires a greater level of risk management, as the approved collection requirements are cancelled to meet the retasking requirements. In addition to a risk management process, dynamic retaskings require a stricter approval process and an increased level of airspace coordination because airspace situational understanding by aircrews and air controllers is necessary.

B-29. Dynamic requests for retasking may follow an eight-line format similar to the one in table B-2.

B-30. Figure B-3 depicts a staff battle drill for dynamic requests of aerial assets.

REDIRECTION OF AERIAL COLLECTION ASSETS

B-31. Redirecting is moving the asset or sensor in accordance with the ATO and ISR annex, and does not require air and space operations center approval or a transfer of tactical control, unless otherwise specified in the ISR annex. Intelligence staffs should anticipate potential requirements for redirecting and provide language in the mission task order that minimizes collection dilemmas during execution. When working in a direct support role, the air and space operations center permits redirection of aerial assets as much as possible.

Table B-2. Format for dynamic requests for retasking

Line Number	*Explanation*
Line 1: Desired support	**Required.** Request the type of aerial support required. Most common entries are full-motion video, electro-optical, infrared.
Line 2: Target name	**Required.** Most common target name entries are the building name, facility, or location name of the target.
Line 3: Target location	**Required.** The latitude and longitude location, military grid reference system location, and Universal Transverse Mercator coordinate of the target location.
Line 4: Essential elements of information	**Required.** The essential elements of information that, when observed, are reported. (These are normally groups and indicators. See paragraphs 3-27 through 3-30.)
Line 5: Earliest or latest time information is of value	**Required.** The collection time. Earliest time information is of value is the earliest time that the information collected is of value to the requesting units. Latest time information is of value is the latest time the collected information is of value to the requesting unit.
Line 6: Reporting instructions	**Required.** Reporting instructions to the collecting unit. The requesting unit must know collector's report types and then specify the report type required. The requesting unit may request negative reporting be included.
Line 7: Asset detection concerns	**Optional.** Aerial asset detection concerns.
Line 8: Airspace control deconfliction	**Optional.** Any airspace control deconfliction measures required by this request.

The brigade combat team (BCT) identifies an information requirement and is unable to meet the need by retasking organic assets. The BCT S-2 or S-3 submits a request to the division G-2 collection management element, including the following information:

- Task and purpose for additional assets.
- Length of time the requested asset is required.
- Why the BCT cannot use an organic asset to meet the requirement.
- The task or mission the asset will support.
- A hasty collection plan.

Note. BCT S-3s may call the division current operations integration cell directly to provide situational awareness and help expedite the process. However, all requests must be sent to the collection management element. The current operations integration cell does not make a final decision until the collection management element or G-2 operations provides a recommendation.

The collection management element performs an initial analysis:

- If assets are not available without impacting division or BCT operations, the collection management element contacts the current operations integration cell with possible courses of action for retasking assets.
- If assets are available without impacting division or BCT operations, the collection management element obtains G-3 approval to retask the asset, retasks the asset, and notifies G-2 operations for situational awareness.
- If meeting the request might require a corps asset, the collection management element alerts corps of a possible request.
- The current operations integration cell contacts the losing BCT for operational assessment and impact.

Decision Point: The current operations integration cell approves or denies the BCT's request.

Figure B-3. Dynamic request battle drill example

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Glossary

SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ADP	Army doctrine publication
ADRP	Army doctrine reference publication
AO	area of operations
AR	Army regulation
ATO	air tasking order
ATP	Army techniques publication
ATTP	Army tactics techniques and procedures
BCT	brigade combat team
CCIR	commander's critical information requirement
DA	Department of the Army
DOD	Department of Defense
DODD	Department of Defense directive
FM	field manual
G-2	assistant chief of staff, intelligence
G-3	assistant chief of staff, operations
HUMINT	human intelligence
IPB	intelligence preparation of the battlefield
ISR	intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaisance
JP	joint publication
LTIOV	latest time information is of value
MDMP	military decisionmaking process
NAI	named area of interest
PED	processing, exploitation, and dissemination
PIR	priority intelligence requirement
S-2	battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer
S-3	battalion or brigade operations staff officer
SIGINT	signals intelligence
SIR	specific information requirement
SOP	standard operating procedure
TAI	targeted area of interest
TC	training circular
UAS	unmanned aircraft system
U.S.	United States

SECTION II – TERMS

assessment

(joint) Determination of the progress toward accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an objective. (JP 3-0)

branch

(joint) The contingency options built into the base plan used for changing the mission, orientation, or direction of movement of a force to aid success of the operation based on anticipated events, opportunities, or disruptions caused by enemy actions and reactions. (JP 5-0)

commander' critical information requirment

(joint) An information requirement identified by the commander as being critical to facilitating timely decisionmaking. Also called CCIR. (JP 3-0)

commander's visualization

The mental process of developing situational understanding, determining a desired end state, and envisioning an operational approach by which the force will achieve that end state. (ADP 5-0)

indicator

(joint) In intelligence usage, an item of information which reflects the intention or capability of an adversary to adopt or reject a course of action. (JP 2-0)

information collection

An activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of sensors and assets as well as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. (FM 3-55)

intelligence operations

(Army) The tasks undertaken by military intelligence units and Soldiers to obtain information to satisfy validated requirements. (ADRP 2-0) (joint) The variety of intelligence and counterintelligence tasks that are carried out by various intelligence organizations and activities within the intelligence process. (JP 2-01)

***latest time information is of value**

The time by which an intelligence organization or staff must deliver information to the requester in order to provide decisionmakers with timely intelligence. This must include the time anticipated for processing and disseminating that information as well as for making the decision. Also called LTIOV.

named area of interest

(Army) The geographical area where information that will satisfy a specific information requirement can be collected. Also called NAI. (ADRP 1-02)

***plan requirements and assess collection**

The task of analyzing requirements, evaluating available assets (internal and external), recommending to the operations staff taskings for information collection assets, submitting requests for information for adjacent and higher collection support, and assessing the effectiveness of the information collection plan.

priority intelligence requirement

(joint) An intelligence requirement, stated as a priority for intelligence support, that the commander and staff need to understand the adversary or other aspects of the operational environment. Also called PIR. (JP 2-01)

running estimate

The continuous assessment of the current situation used to determine if the current operation is proceeding according to the commander's intent and if planned future operations are supportable. (ADP 5-0)

sequel

(joint) The subsequent major operation or phase based on the possible outcomes (success, stalemate, or defeat) of the current major operation or phase. (JP 5-0)

situational understanding

The product of applying analysis and judgment to relevant information to determine the relationship among the operational and mission variables to facilitate decisionmaking. (ADP 5-0)

targeted area of interest

(Army) The geographical area or point along a mobility corridor where successful interdiction will cause the enemy to abandon a particular course of action or require the enemy to use specialized engineer support to continue. It is where the enemy force can be acquired and engaged by friendly forces. Also called TAI. (ADRP 1-02)

unified action

(joint) The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. (JP 1)

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ATP 2-01
19 August 2014

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General, United States Army
Chief of Staff

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

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